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Abstract
Proactive information delivery is critical to achieving effective teamwork. However, existing the-
ories do not adequately address proactive information delivery. This paper presents a formal frame-
work for proactive information delivery in agent teamwork. First, the concept of information need
is introduced. Second, a new modal operator, InfoNeed is used to represent information needs. The
properties of the InfoNeed operator and its relationships to other mental modal operators are ex-
amined, four types of information needs are formally identified, and axioms for anticipating the
information needs of other agents are proposed and justified. Third, the axiom characterizing chains
of helpful behavior in large agent teams is given. Fourth, the semantics for two proactive commu-
nicative acts (ProInform and 3PTSubscribe) is given using a reformulation of the Cohen–Levesque
semantics for communicative acts in terms of the SharedPlans formalism of Grosz and Kraus. The
work in this paper not only provides a better understanding of the underlying assumptions required
to justify proactive information delivery behavior, but also provides a coherent basis for the specifi-
cation and design of agent teams with proactive information delivery capabilities.
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Proactivity refers to the ability to take initiatives, make conscious decisions, and take
positive actions to achieve chosen goals. Proactivity is taken to be one of the key charac-
teristics of software agents [98]. Proactive agents cannot only respond to external stimuli
in a timely manner, but they can also deliberate on, choose among, and act upon the possi-
bilities created by the stimuli.
Proactivity is especially critical for teamwork in business management [28], psychol-
ogy [48] and artificial intelligence. Kirkman and Rosen [53] found that proactive teams are
more effective than less proactive teams; Jauch and Kraft [49] and LaPorte and Consolini
[60] showed that organizations with proactive agents generally outperform those with only
reactive agents, especially in how efficiently they respond. The effects of different types
of agent proactivity on organizational decision-making performance also have been stud-
ied [63], and it is found that proactive behavior becomes more critical for organizational
success as work becomes more dynamic and decentralized [27].
There are various kinds of proactive behaviors in teamwork. One of these, helping be-
havior, is of particular interest in the literature [74,99]. In the multi-agent system (MAS)
field, helping behavior can be illustrated in several existing formal frameworks. For in-
stance, from the viewpoint of the theory of Joint Intentions [23,25], helping behavior
occurs whenever a team member helps another with his/her responsibilities in order to
achieve the goals to which they are committed. The SharedPlans theory even has axioms
for specifying helping behaviors [42,43].
On the other hand, effective teamwork relies on communication. Communication plays
an essential role in dynamic team formation [88], in maintaining shared situation aware-
ness [94], in coordinating team activities [91,99], and more theoretically, in the forming,
evolving, and terminating of both joint intentions [25] and shared plans [43].
This paper centers on a communication-related helping behavior—proactive informa-
tion delivery, by which we mean “providing relevant information without being asked”.
One motivation of our study of proactive information delivery in the context of team-
work is that it is widely recognized that the “ask/reply” approach, although useful and
even necessary in many cases, does have limitations; and proactive communication may
provide a complementary solution [27,99]. For instance, an information consumer in a
team—whether a human or software agent—may not realize that certain information it
has is already out of date. If this agent had to verify the validity of every piece of infor-
mation before using it (e.g., in decision making), the team could be easily overwhelmed
by the amount of communication entailed by these verification messages. Proactive infor-
mation delivery offers an alternative, as it shifts the burden of updating information from
the information consumer to the information provider, who typically has direct knowledge
about any changes. In addition, an agent, due to its limited knowledge, may not realize that
it needs certain information. For instance, a piece of information may be obtained only
through a chain of inferences (e.g., being fused according to certain domain-related rules).
If the agent does not have all the knowledge needed to make such a chain of inferences,
it simply cannot realize that it needs the information, and thus does not know enough to
request it. Proactive information delivery allows teammates to assist the agent in such a
circumstance.
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corporate proactive information delivery in their planning. For example, in BattleSpace
InfoSphere [94], an echelon unit’s plan (e.g., the operational order for an army brigade) of-
ten anticipates critical decisions the commanders need to make and specifies information
needed to make these decisions in the plan. These decisions are called “decision points” in
the operational order, and the information needs of the commander are called “Comman-
der’s Critical Information Requirements” (CCIR). Based on a CCIR, the unit’s intelligence
officer and scouts are able to proactively deliver relevant information to the commander.
We believe this approach adopted by human teams provides critical evidence that soft-
ware agents could also benefit from being equipped with proactive information delivery
capabilities.
Inter-agent communication has been studied extensively [34]. For instance, many re-
searchers have been studying agent communication languages (ACL) that agents in dis-
tributed computing environments use to share information. KQML [59] and FIPA’s ACL
[1] are two attempts toward a standardized ACL. The mental-state semantics of ACL is one
of the most developed areas [11,57], where most efforts are based on Cohen and Levesque’s
work [22]. However, aside from the open issues in ACL verification, ontology integration,
and conversational semantics [17], we claim that proactive information delivery behavior
cannot be elegantly captured by the existing ACL performatives. In other words, the exist-
ing ACLs [1,59] are not expressive enough to represent proactive communications among
agents.
In the rest of this section, we trace existing research on proactive information delivery
behavior from different disciplines. In particular, we examine the indirect speech acts in
discourse theory, psychological studies in human teamwork, helping behavior originated
from maintaining SharedPlans, and information-pushing technology. This review enables
us to identify the key issues that a theory about proactive information delivery should
address.
1.1. Proactive information delivery in discourse theory
Proactive information delivery behavior was first recognized in the 1970s by researchers
in the field of human discourse understanding [3,4,64] in their studies of indirect speech
acts [80]. Indirect speech acts are those that appear to mean one thing yet are treated as
though they mean something else. Based on a plan-recognition model of the language-
comprehension process [3], Allen explained why a hearer could generate helpful responses
that convey more information to the speaker than was explicitly requested. Here, the proac-
tivity relies on the hearer’s ability to analyze direct and indirect speech acts, to infer the
speaker’s plans and then to detect obstacles in those plans. It is claimed that “many in-
stances of helpful behavior [in discourse] arise because the observing agent recognizes an
obstacle in the other agent’s plan and acts to remove the obstacle”. For instance, sentence
A in the following session is a typical indirect speech act:
A: When is the train to Hamilton leaving?
B: That train was canceled.
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ing well that the train was canceled, B may want to notify A regarding other obstacles,
especially ones that A is not aware of. Here, B provides a helpful response (without being
directly asked) because B believes that A intends to go to Hamilton today and believes
that A does not know that today’s train has been canceled. In essence, B provided extra
information based on B’s inference of A’s goal and A’s plan for achieving that goal.
1.2. Proactive information delivery in human teamwork
Human teamwork depends on handling and sharing information [90]. Researchers have
sought to understand the potential relationships between information and team perfor-
mance [27,61]. Team members typically tend to proactively seek new information to
achieve their joint goals [45]. Some psychological studies about high-performing teams
have identified the ability to proactively offer information needed by teammates as one of
the key characteristics of effective teamwork [32,68,86].
Proactive information delivery occurs more frequently when human teams need to filter
and fuse an overwhelming amount of information and to make critical decisions under time
pressure. For instance, applications for dynamic domains such as BattleSpace InfoSphere
[94] often require a large number of intelligent agents and human agents to form a team to
cooperate effectively in information gathering, information fusion and information delivery
for making better group decisions.
It is well recognized that helping behavior in human teams is enabled by some “over-
lapping shared mental models” that are developed and maintained by members of the team
[16,74,76,78,89]. It is also shown that the hypothetical cognitive construct of shared mental
models could explain certain coordinated team behaviors [14,15,92].
1.3. Proactive behavior in the SharedPlans theory
Another significant thread of research in human dialogues is to explain certain prop-
erties of discourse using the notion of SharedPlans. In this view, the participants in a
discourse mutually believe they are working toward establishing the beliefs and intentions
that are necessary for one to say that the participants have a shared plan [44]. In this study,
proactive behavior is implicitly captured in a ‘conversational default rule’ (CDR2), which
states that an agent in a group will adopt an intention to do an action if the performance of
the action would contribute to the achievement of the group’s joint goal. Proactive infor-
mation delivery can thus be taken as one reification of this schematic rule with appropriate
communicative actions as the substitutes.
Using SharedPlans to explore the proactivity in human discourse can be traced to
Lochbaum’s work [65–67], where she showed that the SharedPlans theory provides a more
detailed account of an agent’s motivations for an utterance or initiation of a discourse. In
her model, each segment of a discourse is understood in terms of a shared plan correspond-
ing to the purpose of that segment, and the utterances of a segment are understood as the
participating agents’ contribution toward the completion of the shared plan. The objective
of these shared plans is to let action performers acquire knowledge (e.g., recipes and values
for action parameters) necessary to perform their actions. Proactive information delivery
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an agent’s reflection that there is a lack of knowledge about an action to be performed
initiates an information-seeking dialogue. The hearer, knowing the speaker’s information
needs, tries to help by providing relevant information. While the proactive information
delivery revealed by Lochbaum only lies in the information-seeking dialogues regarding
knowledge preconditions, her approach of using the SharedPlans theory could be extended
to also cover proactivity involving physical preconditions and other constraints. The major
limitation lies in the weak notion of proactivity: it does not address the proactive nature of
providing information without being asked.
1.4. Information pushing
Information pushing [29], which has been widely adopted by Web-based information
services, refers to the behavior of delivering information to a user based on a personalized
profile specific to that user. Information pushing is certainly related to proactive informa-
tion delivery because an effective user profile typically defines what information is needed
and when it is needed. Information is delivered to a user if and only if it fits the personalized
criteria set by the user. Among others, the criteria could include complicated and dynamic
metrics to ensure that users are not “spammed” [2]. The metrics can also be automatically
updated or learned from users’ behavior patterns.
Flexibility and rationality are critical to applications using information pushing tech-
nology. It is noted that most of the systems broke down when users tried to go beyond
the predefined information needs [2]. Thus, the assumption that all information needs in
dynamic settings can be defined in advance is simply wrong. On the other hand, intelli-
gent pushing is desirable because presenting too much information would lead to cognitive
overload. In that case, users are forced to take into account information they already know
or consider irrelevant.
1.5. The objective and desiderata
We first characterize the agent teams to which our proposed theory will apply. The
teams we are considering share the following: (1) they have distributed expertise, so team
members need to exchange information; (2) they are working under pressure and need to
deliver information in a timely manner; (3) communication is limited for various reasons,
further necessitating selective information exchange; and (4) the team has to filter, fuse,
and interpret overwhelming amounts of information. These characteristics are common for
many teams in the real world.
The objective of developing a theory about proactive information delivery is three-fold.
First, the theory should provide a guide for the specification and design of agent architec-
tures, algorithms, and applications that support proactive information delivery capabilities.
Second, the theory will shed light on the mental states of the performers in proactive
communication actions, as well as uncover the limitations and necessary assumptions of
proactive information exchanges in a multi-agent system. Third, the theory offers opportu-
nities for exploiting novel agent communication protocols that support proactive teamwork
behaviors.
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described above for the following reasons. Allen’s work relies too much on interpreting
preceding utterances, psychological studies give little insight on how to build compu-
tational models for proactive information delivery, the SharedPlans theory lacks enough
support for reasoning about and acting upon teammates’ information needs, and informa-
tion pushing is too much limited and typically unidirectional. We next describe each in
more detail.
Allen’s observations of how a lack of information in human discourse can elicit helping
behavior [3] certainly shed light on the study of proactive information delivery behavior in
multi-agent teamwork settings. Based on Allen’s studies, the following issues are critical to
establishing a theory for proactive information exchange: (1) relevance: proactive behavior
should be directed toward an addressee’s goal; (2) shared knowledge: the participants need
to have certain shared knowledge to recognize each other’s plans; (3) intentional semantics:
the speaker’s mental attitudes, as expressed through speech acts, can affect those of the
addressee.
However, proactive information delivery becomes more convoluted in the agent teams
described above. First, in human dialogues, indirect speech acts can be understood by
considering the idiomatic meaning behind the literal meaning, by using inference schema
(i.e., to rate the potential choices by heuristics or inference rules), or by using back-
ground/context knowledge to infer others’ intentions [3,12]. When modeling proactive
information delivery in large agent teams or teams mixed with human and software agents,
more subtle issues need to be considered, such as the level of abstraction, shared mental
states, computational complexity. Second, Allen’s work relies heavily on the audience’s
recognition, based on certain rules and heuristics, of the speaker’s intentions and plans [6].
While modeling discourse understanding as plan recognition is reasonable for human dis-
course, it is not practical for large agent teams because each member needs to recognize
teammates’ plans which may have numerous alternatives [22].1 Agents in a large team
can easily diverge in anticipating a certain team member’s intentions due to the difficulty
of matching teammates’ inferences. Such a divergence may impact team performance and
even inhibit the team’s achievement of its joint goals. Third, the distinction between in-
direct and direct speech acts in human discourse is no longer that important for teams
facing overwhelming amounts of information under time pressure. More likely, proactive
information delivery is triggered by an agent’s anticipation of teammates’ needs without
any preceding conversation, rather than triggered by the agent’s understanding of the im-
plicit meaning of preceding speech acts (e.g., as in the ask/reply mode, also known as the
master-slave assumption [44]).
Even though psychological studies [15,16] have shown that members of high perform-
ing human teams often offer relevant information to teammates before they ask, it is
difficult from these empirical studies to derive a general formalism for proactive infor-
mation delivery behavior that also applies to agent teams. However, the studies do suggest
that the anticipation of information needs and shared awareness of team activities are crit-
ical constructs of theories about proactive information delivery.
1 It is still computationally hard even if the intended recognition assumption [19] is adopted.
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of team activities. In addition, the SharedPlans theory has axioms for deriving help be-
haviors [42,43]. Being slightly extended, it can also cover proactive information delivery
behavior in agent teams. However, this view is not particularly satisfying. To the extent
possible, we would like to establish a framework where information needs can be treated
as a first-class notion so that agents can reason about and act upon teammates’ information
needs. The proactivity in Lochbaum’s work [67] relies on discourse understanding. We be-
lieve this suffers from the same limitations as Allen’s work [3]: it requires the information
provider to infer the speaker’s information needs from the preceding utterances. What is
more important in proactive information delivery is that an agent should rationally antici-
pate teammates’ information needs and push the relevant information in a timely manner.
In a study by Grosz and Sidner [44], one of the two-person discourses implies information
can be delivered without being requested. However, the utterances are more like orders and
clarifications from a commander.
Although proactive information delivery and personalized information pushing are sim-
ilar in that they both send information to an information consumer in a proactive way
based on the anticipation of his/her information needs, they differ in several aspects. For
instance, the former requires a more abstract and broader understanding of the information
consumer’s needs (e.g., a shared awareness of the team goals, the planned team activities or
each other’s roles and responsibilities). Also, proactive communications are bi-directional
in a team whereas personalized information pushing is only from the computer to the
user. On the other hand, proactive information delivery can be viewed as a general ex-
tension of personalized information pushing in the context of teamwork. Thus, feasibility
and rationality, as suggested by the practice of information pushing technology, should be
considered in developing theories for proactive information delivery. In particular, such a
theory should support dynamic reasoning about information needs (e.g., activate/deactivate
information needs when an agent switches its attention from one activity to another) and
allow decision making on whether to provide help.
To summarize, a theory about proactive information delivery in agent teams should ad-
dress at least three issues. First, the concept of “information needs” should be treated as
a first-class notion. The properties of information needs and its possible relationships to
agents’ mental attitudes should be examined. Also information needs should be relativized
to certain contexts in order to support dynamic reasoning. Second, the theory should allow
an agent to anticipate teammates’ information needs based on logical axioms, assumptions,
heuristic rules, or approximate reasoning. Such anticipation may demand the modeling of
shared team activities (e.g., team processes) and nested epistemic states (e.g., one’s belief
about teammates’ beliefs). Third, the theory should connect information needs to proac-
tive communications. The connection should be intuitively simple while flexible enough so
that agents can make the final decisions on whether and how to communicate. The theory
also should define appropriate intentional semantics for proactive communicative actions
(henceforth, proactive performatives ) in terms of information needs and other mental at-
titudes. In addition, conversation protocols involving proactive performatives should be
covered in order to investigate how information needs as well as information are exchanged
proactively in agent teams.
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for building our theory and establish the base layer. We give some preparation in Section 3.
Specifically, we discuss the assumptions about mental attitudes, the composition of con-
texts, the properties of collaborative agents, the structure of inference knowledge, and the
re-formulation of the Cohen–Levesque semantics of communicative acts.
In Section 4, we elucidate the concept of information need. In particular, we use ref-
erence expressions to represent information and information needs; introduce a modal
operator InfoNeed to express information needs, examine the properties of InfoNeed and
explore its relationships with other mental modal operators; analyze levels of information
needs based on the idea of social inference trees; and formally identify four types of infor-
mation needs prevalent in agent teamwork. In Section 5, we propose and justify axioms for
anticipating others’ information needs, and in Section 6, we give an axiom which relates
information needs with potential intentions. These axioms together allow agents in a team
to take appropriate actions to satisfy the anticipated information needs.
In Section 7, we formally define the semantics of ProInform(proactive inform), explore
the potential composition of the context of proactive performatives, give a conversation
protocol involving ProInform, and prove some properties related to ProInform. Similarly,
in Section 8, we formally define the semantics of 3PTSubscribe(proactive third-party sub-
scribe), give a conversation protocol involving 3PTSubscribe, and prove some properties
related to 3PTSubscribe.
In Section 9, we discuss the role of agent observability in approximately modeling team-
mates’ belief states and point out some potential implications of the presented theory. We
compare our theory with related work in Section 10, and summarize the paper in Sec-
tion 11.
2. Methodology and the base layer
Among others [52,97], the Joint Intentions theory [23,62] (henceforth, JIT) and the
SharedPlans theory [42,44] (henceforth, SPT) are two widely accepted formalisms for
modeling teamwork. Each has been successfully applied in guiding the design and im-
plementation of multi-agent systems, such as GRATE* [50], STEAM [91], COLLAGEN
[77] and CAST [99].
SPT provides an axiomatic theory of collaborative plans based on four types of inten-
tional attitudes: Int.To, Int.Th, Pot.Int.To, and Pot.Int.Th. A shared plan is characterized in
a mental-state view as a particular collection of beliefs and intentions. A group of agents
have a shared plan if and only if they hold the specified beliefs and intentions. Thus, col-
laboration typically involves agents trying to establish and maintain those required mental
attitudes, and each believes the other agents are doing likewise. A shared plan is associ-
ated with an action decomposition hierarchy. In the process of constructing a shared plan,
a group of agents and various subgroups need to make numerous decisions on reconcil-
ing potential intentions, on choosing parameters for actions, on selecting recipes (courses
of action) and on assigning agents or subgroups to actions at every level of the evolv-
ing decomposition hierarchy. Hunsberger proposed using SharedPlans Trees to explicitly
represent the choices already made by a group working on some shared plan [47]. SPT,
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general approach to group planning.2
JIT generalizes the belief-goal-commitment model of agent mental states [20] by
proposing a notion of joint intentions, from which individuals derive their own intentions.
Compared with SPT, JIT embodies a stronger dependency on communication: Whenever
agents realize a joint goal is satisfied, becomes unachievable or irrelevant, they are re-
quired to inform one another of the achievement or impossibility of the joint goal before
abandoning the joint commitment. Due to such a strong requirement on communication in
establishing and maintaining joint intentions, Cohen and Levesque introduced speech act
theory into their framework [21,22,24,25]. Their idea of performative-as-attempt has been
widely accepted as a standard in ascribing mentalistic semantics to communicative acts
[1,46,55,56].
In JIT, individual intentions are represented by INTEND1 and INTEND2,3 which cor-
respond to Int.To and Int.Th in SPT, respectively. One difference between these two notions
of intentions is that they embody different degrees of commitment. INTEND1 and IN-
TEND2 employ a strong notion of commitment: an agent commits to its persistent goal
until it believes the goal is satisfied, believes it is unachievable, or believes the relativiza-
tion condition is false. In SPT, however, intentions (Int.To, Int.Th) entail commitment in a
weaker sense: an agent may drop intentions for a variety of reasons [42].
A certain “cohesive force” is needed for establishing, monitoring and disbanding joint
activities [25]. The concepts of joint intentions and shared plans serve as such a cohe-
sive force in JIT and SPT, respectively. But whatever the cohesive force is, it should be
fostered and maintained by all team members in their pursuit of the team goals. For this
reason, agents having a joint intention cannot act knowingly to foil the fulfillment of the
joint intention; likewise, agents having a shared plan must reconcile potential intentions
prudently so that agents will not ruin the already adopted intentions and thereby inhibit the
completion of the shared plan.
While JIT and SPT are able to capture many important behaviors of agent teamwork,
both of them exhibit certain limitations. For instance, JIT considers actions and plans only
at a high-level without considering the decomposition of complex actions at different lev-
els of abstraction. JIT also does not capture how agents elaborate upon their partial joint
and individual plans [25]. Compared with JIT,4 SPT explores the hierarchical structure of
shared plans and addresses partiality in a significant way. However, SPT still lacks an ade-
quate semantics for the “potential intention” operators and the “intentional context” terms
[42] (but see Fan and Yen’s recent attempt [37] for the semantics of potential intentions).
Furthermore, it may be problematic that the definition of Int.Th does not link to the prim-
itive Commit operator [25]. But on the other hand, the respective weakpoints of the two
theories may be attributed to their different emphases: JIT focuses on investigating the
2 Such a mental-state view of plans originated from Bratman [10].
3 (INTEND1 A α C) represents that agent A intends to do action α relative to condition C. (INTEND2 A p C)
represents that agent A intends that p hold relative to condition C [20].
4 One subtle difference between SPT and JIT is that JIT relies on a notion of irreducible collective intentionality
while SPT adopts an “individualistic” approach to collective intentionality (similar to Bratman’s) in that it requires
no irreducible notion of “we-intention [93]”.
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shared plans and the treatment of partiality through agents’ means-ends reasoning. In such
a sense, they complement each other. In fact, some implemented agent systems, such as
STEAM [91] and RETSINA [39], benefit from both.
An important consequence of this brief investigation of SPT and JIT is the opportunity
to rethink the issues we identified earlier, regarding the development of a theory of proac-
tive information delivery, and to deliberate on the methodology for doing so. As generic
theories for agent teamwork, neither JIT nor SPT can be directly used to characterize proac-
tive information delivery because both lack the concept of information needs, which we
believe is a key ingredient in a theory of proactive communication. However, SPT and JIT
do offer a basis for developing a theory of proactive information delivery. The specific ele-
ments of JIT useful in developing such a theory include (1) the formal treatment of speech
acts, which establishes a sound foundation for intention-based semantics of performatives
and, as we will show, proactive communicative acts; and (2) the motivation behind commu-
nication related to dropping joint intentions, which helps in inferring others’ information
needs. The specific elements of SPT that can be leveraged include (1) the rich and clean
model of shared team plans,5 which is critical in enabling agents to anticipate teammates’
information needs; (2) the decomposition hierarchy of shared recipes, which encourages
selective information exchange: only that subgroup of agents selected to work on an ac-
tivity need know the top-level information of the plan subtree associated with the activity
[47].
Thus, instead of starting from scratch, the above observation persuades us to develop a
layered formalism built on top of JIT and SPT. There are two options to do so. We can stay
within JIT, or alternatively stay within SPT, by introducing a notion of information need
and axioms for deriving helping behaviors and borrow the necessary features from the
other. If we stay within Cohen and Levesque’s formalism (JIT), the semantics of proactive
performatives can be defined after the notion of information needs is introduced. However,
it is difficult for agents to anticipate others’ information needs within JIT. To address this,
the formalism can be extended to allow agents to hierarchically recognize teammates’ ac-
tive plans. We choose to extend Grosz and Kraus’s SharedPlans theory (SPT) and translate
the idea of ‘performative-as-attempt’ from JIT to SPT (as shown in Fig. 1) for three rea-
sons: (1) the hierarchical expansion of shared plans allows agents to infer others’ potential
intentions, which in turn allows agents to anticipate others’ possible information needs;
(2) even though helping behavior follows smoothly from both JIT and SPT, SPT actually
provides axioms for deriving helping behavior. If extended, they can also be used to charac-
terize chains of helping behaviors; (3) SPT does not provide a semantics for performatives
analogous to that provided by JIT. The lack of a formal grounding for performatives can
discourage the in-depth studies of communication among SPT-based agents.
To make the paper self-inclusive, we first summarize the key concepts underlying the
base layer before considering proactive information delivery in later sections.
5 The richness originates from the treatment of partiality and the cleanness from distinguishing between inten-
tion types.
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2.1. The base layer
2.1.1. Basics of the SharedPlans theory
The SharedPlans formalism of collaborative planning originated from Pollack’s mental
state model of plans [73] and was further extended to accommodate partial plans and the
evolution of shared plans over time [42,43].
We adjust some notations in the SharedPlans theory [42] for our convenience. We use
A,B, . . . ,A′, . . . to refer to individual agents; use α,β, . . . ( and its primes are used specif-
ically to refer to utterance events) to denote act-types; use t with superscripts or subscripts
to denote time points (by default, t refers to the current time point);6 use R with an act-type
as its subscript to denote a recipe for that type of actions (a recipe is composed of action
decomposition and constraints); use C with a subscript, such as Cα ,Cp , to refer to an in-
tentional context, and use Θ with an act-type as its subscript to denote constraints for that
type of actions. The components of a constraint may be classified into three types: execu-
tion preconditions, recipe-constraints (e.g., time, location or other resources considered in
the selection of recipes for the action), and constraints considered in reconciling potential
conflicts. The composition of a context will be discussed later.
Shared plans are defined in terms of modal operators, meta-predicates (i.e., abbrevia-
tions for complex formulas involving other predicates or modal operators) and actions. In
addition to Bel (belief) and MB (mutual belief), three modal operators are used to relate
agents and actions (Exec, Commit, and Do), and four modal operators are used to specify
the attitudes of intention (Int.To and Pot.Int.To apply to actions while Int.Th and Pot.Int.Th
apply to propositions). Exec(A,α, t,Θα) represents that agent A has the ability to perform
basic-level action α at time t under the constraints Θα ; Commit(A,α, t1, t2,Cα) represents
the commitment of agent A at t1 to perform the basic-level action α at t2 under the context
Cα ; Do(A,α, t,Θα) represents that an agent (or a group of agents) A performs action α at
time (beginning at, in the case of an interval) t under constraints Θα .
Int.To(A,α, t, tα,Cα) represents that at time t , agent A intends to do α at time tα in
the context Cα . Int.To stimulates means-end reasoning. When the action that an agent in-
6 Time is treated as an ordered set of discrete points. We assume primitive actions performed at time t will be
done by the next time point. The performance of a complex action may span several time points.
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Int.To reduces to Commit; otherwise, the agent will try to compose a recipe for the action
before doing it. Int.Th(A,p, t, t ′,Cp) represents that agent A at time t intends that p hold
at t ′ under the intentional context Cp . While intentions-to only apply to individual agent
actions, intentions-that can be used to initiate team activities involving a group of cooper-
ators. In fact, Int.Th plays an essential role in meshing subplans, helping teammates, and
reconciling resource or intention conflicts. Pot.Int.To(A,α, t, tα,Cα) represents that agent
A has a potential intention to do α. Int.To is used to represent goals to which agents are
fully committed, while Pot.Int.Tos refer to possible goals to which agents are not yet fully
committed. An agent may convert a Pot.Int.To to an Int.To if the potential intention does
not contradict the already adopted intentions. A Pot.Int.To has to be dropped should there
be any conflicts. Similarly, Pot.Int.Th(A,p, t, t ′,Cp) refers to a potential intention-that.
A Pot.Int.Th needs to go through a similar deliberation process before it can be adopted as
a full-fledged intention.
Several meta-predicates were defined. Among others, CBA(A,α,Rα, tα,Θα) represents
that agent A is able to bring about single-agent action α at tα under constraints Θα by
following recipe Rα . CBA represents the knowledge an agent has about its ability to per-
form an action in a plan. Meta-predicate CONF is used to represent actions/propositions
conflicts. In particular, CONF(α,p, tα, tp, Cα,Cp) represents the situation in which the
performance of action α conflicts with p continuing to hold. Shared mental states among
a team of agents are reflected in their partial shared plans (denoted by PSP) or full shared
plans (denoted by FSP).
Grosz and Kraus proposed several axioms that can be used to derive helpful behaviors
[42,43]. For instance, they gave two axioms (A5 and A6, [42]) which state that an agent
will form a potential intention to do all the actions it thinks might be helpful.7 Later, they
gave another axiom (Axiom 2, [43]) which states that if an agent intends-that p hold and
there exist some alternative actions the agent can take that would lead to p holding, then
the agent must be in one of three potential states: (1) the agent holds a potential intention
to do some of these actions; (2) the agent holds an intention to do some of these actions;
or (3) the agent has reconciled all possible actions it could take and determined they each
conflict in some way with other intentions [43]. In essence, the two treatments [42,43] are
consistent; they characterize “intending-that” from two perspectives. The former shows
how Pot.Int.Tos are triggered from Int.Ths. The latter reflects the process of means-ends
reasoning: an agent first adopts a Pot.Int.To, then reconciles it with existing intentions—
either adopting it as an actual intention, or dropping it to consider other options. In both
treatments, it could be the case that all Pot.Int.Tos serving the same ends have been tried
but none can be reconciled into actual intentions.
7 Probably, this is one subtle point where “potential intentions” differ from what Cohen and Levesque term an
agent “goal”. It is too strong to require an agent to adopt a goal (i.e., chosen desire [20]) to do all the alternative
actions that serve the same ends. But this is acceptable for potential intentions because turning a potential intention
into a full-fledged intention requires some preliminary means-ends reasoning [42]. An agent can drop all the
other potential intentions serving the same ends after the agent successfully reconciles a potential intention into
an intention. One consequence is that an agent cannot hold conflicting goals but can hold conflicting potential
intentions.
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Int.Th(A,p, t, t ′,Cp)∧ ¬Bel(A,p, t)∧ LEAD’(A,β,p, t, tβ ,Θβ)⇒
Pot.Int.To(A,β, t, tβ ,Θβ ∧Cp).
Fig. 2. The axiom characterizing helping behavior.
Grosz and Kraus [43] defined a LEAD predicate, where LEAD(A,β, tβ,p,Θβ, t) rep-
resents that agent A doing action β at time tβ under constraints Θβ leads to proposition
p holding. Because we are only interested in communicative acts, which are assumed to
be single-agent acts, we now define LEAD’—a slightly scaled-down version of LEAD in
which β represents a single-agent, communicative act. LEAD’(A,β,p, t, tβ,Θβ) holds iff
(1) agent A believes there exists a recipe it can follow to do action β , and (2) either β
directly leads to p holding, or the doing of β ‘leads to’ another agent’s being able to do
(CBA) some action α, which directly leads to p holding.
Definition 1. LEAD’(A,β,p, t, tβ,Θβ) Bel(A,P1, t)∧
[Bel(A,P2, t)∨ Bel(A,P3, t)], where
P1 = ∃Rβ · CBA(A,β,Rβ, tβ,Θβ),
P2 = (Do(A,β, tβ,Θβ) ⇒ p), and
P3 = Do(A,β, tβ,Θβ)⇒ ψ , where
ψ = [∃B,α,Rα, tα, t ′′· (tα > tβ)∧ (tα > t ′′)∧
CBA(B,α,Rα, tα,Θα)∧
Pot.Int.To(B,α, t ′′, tα,Θα)∧
(Do(B,α, tα,Θα) ⇒ p)].
We now generalize the axioms A5 and A6 [42] into Axiom 1 in terms of LEAD’. Axiom 1
in Fig. 2 says that if an agent does not believe that p is true now, but has an intention that p
be true at some future time, it will consider doing some action β (Pot.Int.To) if it believes
that the performance of β could contribute to making p true directly or indirectly through
another action by another agent.
2.1.2. Performatives as attempts
Following Searle’s observation on speech acts [79], Cohen and Levesque developed a
formal foundation for agent communication based on their theory of rational agency [20].
In their approach [21,22], all illocutionary acts are treated as attempts. Cohen and Levesque
have given several slightly different definitions of an attempt [21,22,24,55], all of which
define “attempt” as a complex action expression involving a chosen goal and an intention.8
One of their definitions [55], which has a time argument, is given below:
8 Basic notions [21,55]: (HAPPENS expr) and (DONE expr) represent that a sequence of events described
by action expression expr will happen next or has just happened, respectively. Unilateral mutual belief is
defined recursively: (BMB A B p)  (BEL A p ∧ (BMB B A p)). (BEFORE expr p)  (DONE p?; expr),
(AFTER expr p) (HAPPENS expr;p?).
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φ = (BEL A ¬P)∧Θ ∧ (INTEND1 A t?; ;Q? Θ), where
Θ = (GOAL A (HAPPENS ; P ?)).
An attempt at time t to achieve P via Q is a complex action expression in which the
agent A is the actor of event , and just prior to , the agent believes P is false, chooses
that P should eventually become true, and intends that  should produce Q relative to
that choice. Here, P represents some ultimate goal that may or may not be achieved by
the attempt while Q represents an honest effort. More specifically, if the attempt does not
achieve the goal P , the agent may retry the attempt, try some other strategy or even drop
the goal. However, if the attempt does not succeed in achieving the honest effort Q, the
agent is committed to retrying until either Q is achieved or Q becomes unachievable or
irrelevant [21,84].
The semantics of elementary performatives are given by choosing appropriate formulas
(involving mutual beliefs) to substitute for P and Q in the definition of attempt. The
following is a variant of inform defined by Kumar et al. [55].
Definition 3. (inform A B  I t) (attempt A  φ ψ t), where
φ = (BMB B A I),
ψ = (BMB B A P), where
P = (BEFORE  [GOAL A (AFTER  [BEL B (BEFORE  (BEL A I))])]).
The goal of an inform is that the addressee B come to believe that there is a mutual
belief between him and the informing agent A that the proposition I is true. The inten-
tion of an inform is that B come to believe another mutual belief; namely, that before
performing the inform, the informing agent A had the goal that “after the inform is
performed, B will believe that A believed I before performing the inform”.
A request with respect to action α is defined as an attempt of the speaker to make both
the speaker and the addressee believe that the speaker intends that the addressee commit
to performing the action α. Here, the speaker’s commitment is to having his/her wants
understood by the addressee. The following is a variant of the request defined by Cohen
and Levesque [24], where (HELPFUL B A) represents that agent B is helpful to agent A
[22].
Definition 4. (request A B  α t) (attempt A  φ ψ t), where
φ = (DONE B α),
ψ = (BMB B A P), where
P = (BEFORE  (GOAL A [(DONE B α)∧ (AFTER  (INTEND1 B α Θ))])), where
Θ = (GOAL A (DONE B α)∧ (HELPFUL B A)).
Other traditional communicative acts (e.g., ASK) can be defined in terms of inform
and request by using compositionality. For instance, the formal semantics of perfor-
matives in several agent communication languages, such as Arcol [11], KQML [58], and
FIPA’s ACL [1], are all framed in this way. Currently, the idea of performative-as-attempt
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and conversation protocols [55,84].
3. Preliminaries
In this section, we make some preparation for further explorations. Our assumptions on
the belief and intentional attitudes are stated first; then, we consider the notions related to
actions and contexts. Agents in teamwork settings are supposed to be sincere and help-
ful; thus, in Section 3.3 we define team sincerity and propose a richer axiom to specify
chains of helping behaviors. To describe stratified information needs, we introduce the no-
tion of social inference trees in Section 3.4. Several research groups, e.g., CAST [99], have
been using the Cohen–Levesque semantics in systems implemented using the SharedPlans
framework, but there has not been a formal grounding of that semantics in this framework.
To this end, in Section 3.5, we re-formulate the Cohen–Levesque semantics of communica-
tive acts using the SharedPlans formalism. In the following, all free variables are implicitly
universally quantified.
3.1. Assumptions on mental attitudes
We adopt the typical treatment of the belief attitude and assume Bel conforms to the
K , D, 4 and 5 axioms of modal logic [35]. In addition, we assume that the idempotence
property holds for Bel, i.e., Bel(A,Bel(A,p, t), t) ⇔ Bel(A,p, t) (the ⇐ part corresponds
to axiom ‘4’). We adopt the K and D axioms of modal logic for the intentional attitudes
Int.To and Int.Th, and adopt the K axiom for Pot.Int.To and Pot.Int.Th.9 Possible worlds
semantics is used where each possible world is a temporal structure.
Intentions and beliefs persist by default until the newly acquired information causes
conflicts or the original contexts of the intentions no longer hold or the intentions have
been achieved. For Int.Th, as well as the associated context, the second time argument also
serves as one constraint on holding an intention-that. More specifically, suppose agent A
has an intention Int.Th(A,p, t, t3,Cp), and Cp is true before t3. As time goes on from t
to some time t1 (< t3), the intention will become Int.Th(A,p, t1, t3,Cp). Now suppose
that at time t1 agent A comes to believe p. Because p might change between t1 and
t3, A should continue to hold the intention until t3. Of course, in some cases, achieve-
ment goals can be reduced to maintenance goals. For instance, if p is maintainable for
A (e.g., A can control the changing of p), A could replace Int.Th(A,p, t1, t3,Cp) with
Int.To(A,maintain(p), t1, t3,Cp), so that the agent is committed to maintaining p until t3.
9 Numerous researchers have struggled over how best to represent agent intentions [20,42,93]. Grosz and Kraus
did not provide explicit constraints on accessibility relations for these intentional attitudes. K and D are typically
adopted for normal intentions [75]. We adopt K for potential intentions because K is the weakest constraint on
normal modal operators. D is not applicable to Pot.Int.To or Pot.Int.Th because an agent could hold conflicting
potential intentions. K may be insufficient for potential intentions and more constraints can be explored in future
studies. However, in this paper, should confusion occur, Grosz and Kraus’s informal interpretation of potential
intentions [42] applies.
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“goals are known” [21,47] for the relationships between Bel and intentions (Int.To and
Int.Th).
Assumption 1. (1) Int.To(A,α, t, t ′,Cα) ⇒ Bel(A, Int.To(A,α, t, t ′,Cα), t),
(2) Int.Th(A,p, t, t ′,Cp) ⇒ Bel(A, Int.Th(A,p, t, t ′,Cp), t).
We thus have,
Int.To(A,α, t, t ′,Cα) ⇔ Bel(A, Int.To(A,α, t, t ′,Cα), t),
Int.Th(A,p, t, t ′,Cp) ⇔ Bel(A, Int.Th(A,p, t, t ′,Cp), t).
We also assume agents have perfect recall of what was believed.
Assumption 2. Bel(A,Bel(B,p, t0), t) ⇒ ∀t ′  t · Bel(A,Bel(B,p, t0), t ′).
To represent objective views that may conflict with the subjective views of resource-
bounded agents, we introduce a predicate Hold(p, t),10 which means p is objectively true
at time t . Note that Hold is external to any rational agent. It presupposes an omniscient
perspective from which to evaluate p. In other words, assume there exists an omniscient
agent G, then Hold(p, t) = Bel(G,p, t). Hold will be used only within belief or intention
contexts, say Bel(A,Hold(p, t), t), which means agent A believes from the omniscien-
t’s perspective p is true. Since omniscience is always trustable, Bel(A,Hold(p, t), t) ⇒
Bel(A,p, t), but not vice versa.
We define some abbreviations needed later. Awareness (Bif: believe-if [1]);11 belief con-
tradiction (CBel) between two agents that is recognized by one, but not necessarily both;
and wrong beliefs (WBel) are given as:
Definition 5 (Abbreviations).
Bif(A,p, t) Bel(A,p, t)∨ Bel(A,¬p, t),
UBif(A,p, t)¬Bif(A,p, t),
CBel(A,B,p, t) (Bel(A,p, t)∧ Bel(A,Bel(B,¬p, t), t))∨
(Bel(A,¬p, t)∧ Bel(A,Bel(B,p, t), t)),
WBel(A,p, t) (Hold(p, t)∧ Bel(A,¬p, t))∨ (Hold(¬p, t)∧ Bel(A,p, t)).
Note that CBel(A,B,p, t) means from agent A’s point of view, there is a contradiction
regarding p between B and A itself. It may be the case that there actually is not a con-
tradiction at all (i.e., A was wrong). Also note that the definition given is not reflexive, so
CBel(A,A,p, t) does not hold. Nor is it symmetric. For example, A might believe there
10 In this paper, propositions may or may not have a time or time interval associated with them. If a proposition
p has an associated time argument, it can be different from the external times, say, t in Hold(p, t).
11 We assume that belief bases allow three possible truth values for propositions.
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also have: Bel(A,WBel(B,p, t), t) ⇒ CBel(A,B,p, t).
3.2. Actions and context
An action is either primitive or complex. Complex actions can be built from primitive
actions by using the constructs of dynamic logic: α;β for sequential composition, α|β for
nondeterministic choice, p? for testing (where p is a logical formula), and α∗ for repetition.
Let post(α) return a conjunction of propositions that describe the effects of α.
The SharedPlans theory defines a recipe for a complex act-type γ as a specification of
a group of subsidiary actions, the doing of which under certain constraints constitutes the
performance of γ . Thus, a recipe per se is composed of an action expression and a set of
constraints on the action expression. A set of recipes can be specified for an act-type. Let
recipeA(α) be the set of recipes of α specified for agent A. recipeA(α) and recipeB(α) may
be the same, overlapped, or even disjoint.
The SharedPlans theory assumes that all actions are intended, committed and performed
in some specific context [42]. In this paper, the notion of context is extended to be used
in three different ways. In addition to being arguments of intentions, contexts will also
play important roles in the notion of information needs and the semantics of proactive
performatives introduced later.
We use C or C with subscripts or superscripts to refer to contexts. Nevertheless, the sub-
script (or superscript) on a context does not impart any meaning to the context; the meaning
of a context only depends on where the context occurs. For instance, when C1 occurs as
an argument of Int.To(intention-to), it refers to the context in which the action (another ar-
gument of Int.To) is being done; when C1 occurs as an argument of Int.Th(intention-that),
it refers to the context in which the proposition (another argument of Int.Th) is intended.
However, to make notations more consistent, we use Cα (or Cp) to refer to the context in
which action α (or proposition p) is concerned.
Grosz and Kraus allowed an intentional context to include terms. For instance, the par-
tial recipe a group of agents have is part of the intentional context for the intention-to do
subsidiary actions [43]. To be uniform, we choose to use meta-predicates to represent terms
in contexts. For example, has.recipe(A,α,R, t), which was initially used by Lochbaum
[67], can be used to represent that “agent A has recipe R to do action α at time t”. We thus
take a context as being composed of a set of formulae, which are collectively evaluated
as one conjunction. Our treatment of context establishes a correspondence between the
intentional context in SPT and the term “escape clause” in JIT. However, the notion of in-
tentional contexts is richer than escape clauses. In addition to conditions that allow agents
to be free from their commitments, intentional contexts can also include other constraints
that guide replanning or recipe selection.
In general, the constituent formulae of a context may play different roles. Some part of a
context may serve as constraints. For instance, the deadline of doing α and the dependency
of α on other actions might impose constraints on the performance of α. Some part of a
context may serve as traces of explanation. For instance, a chain of actions may be invoked
for the achievement of a certain goal. Some part of a context may serve as criteria for
attention management such as goal reconciliation or task delegation; and some may serve
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behavior, etc. Thus, we assume each context formula is associated with certain meta-level
information indicating the roles of the formula, and functions are defined for obtaining
those components of a context related to a specific role. For example, Constr(C1) denotes
the constraints component of context C1.
Let p1, p2, and p3 be formulae, C1 = {p1,p2}. For notational convenience, we use
C1 ∪ {p3}, C1 ∧ p3, and p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3 interchangeably when they are used as context. We
also use p ∈ C to represent that p is a part of the context C.
3.3. Properties of collaborative agents
We fix TA and TB to be two agent teams, each with a finite number of members.
T ,T1, T2, . . . are used to refer to subsets of TA (or TB).
Within a team, all the member agents share certain joint objectives, and we assume they
are sincere in communication and exhibit a certain degree of helpfulness in their collabora-
tions for achieving their shared goals. An agent is insincere if it knowingly wants others to
come to believe false things [22]. Thus, we say that an agent is sincere if the agent desires
to achieve consistent beliefs with other teammates.
Axiom 2 in Fig. 3 says that, (1) whenever an agent A has an intention toward letting
another agent B believe p, then A also commits to making p true; (2) whenever an agent
A has an intention toward letting another agent B believe that ‘A believes p’, then A itself
really believes p and commits to making p true.
The sincerity axiom in Fig. 3 involves two forms of intentions. By Axiom 1 (cf. Fig. 2),
the intention Int.Th(A,Bel(B,p, t2), t, t1,C) could lead agent A to perform certain (com-
municative) actions (e.g., inform B directly, or request that another agent inform B).
The intention Int.Th(A,Hold(p, t2), t, t1,C) serves as a constraint on adopting new in-
tentions. For instance, to be sincere, before t2 (say, t ′) agent A cannot adopt an intention
Int.Th(A,¬p, t, t ′,C′), nor can A adopt intentions to perform actions that may inhibit B
from getting the truth regarding p. One consequence of this axiom is that a sincere agent
only communicates information that it believes to be true.
In essence, this characterization of agent sincerity is equivalent to Cohen and Levesque’s
[22]. Their definition requires that whenever agent A wants agent B to come to believe p,
it actually wants B to come to know p. Since knowledge is true belief, A’s chosen desire
of “letting B know p” serves the same role as Int.Th(A,Hold(p, t2), t, t1,C) does. Note
that both definitions allow an agent to perform third-party communicative actions to fulfill
its sincerity to another agent. This is attainable because there is no constraint in Cohen and
Levesque’s definition that may preclude an agent from adopting an action e involving a
third-party. Later we will show that in our framework third-party actions can be triggered
Axiom 2 (Sincerity: from A to B).
(1) Int.Th(A,Bel(B,p, t2), t, t1,C)⇒ Int.Th(A,Hold(p, t2), t, t1,C),
(2) Int.Th(A,Bel(B,Bel(A,p, t), t2), t, t1,C)⇒
[Bel(A,p, t)∧ Int.Th(A,Hold(p, t2), t, t1,C)].
Fig. 3. The sincerity axiom.
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A can request other teammates to help B .
Now we come to the concept of “helpfulness”. Axiom 1 (cf. Fig. 2) is a specification
for helping behaviors: if an agent intends that p hold, it must be willing to consider un-
dertaking actions that will help achieve p [43]. For instance, suppose an agent A has an
intention to make p true (Int.Th). A will adopt a potential intention to do action α if the
performance of α will enable another agent B to perform some action β , which would
directly make p true. Ask/reply is an instance of using this axiom: after being asked, if
an agent has adopted an intention to honor the information request, ‘reply’ is a potential
way to do so. Enabling others’ physical actions also falls into this category. For example,
a logistics person supplies ammunition to a fighter in a joint mission.
Cohen and Levesque also defined “helpfulness” in their framework [22]. Agent A is
helpful to agent B if for any action that B wants A to do, A actually adopts a goal to
eventually do that action, whenever such a goal would not conflict with A’s own. The
notion of helpfulness characterized in Axiom 1 is different from Cohen and Levesque’s.
In Axiom 1, an agent adopts helping behavior relative to its commitments to team ac-
tivity or its own individual goals involving other agents (e.g., if agent A has intention
Int.Th(A,Bel(B,p, t ′), t, t ′,C), it will commit to doing some action if that action can lead
to letting B know p at t ′); while in Cohen and Levesque’s approach, an agent adopts its
commitment (helping behavior) relative to the other agent’s goal. In a sense, Cohen and
Levesque’s notion is more like a response of one agent to another’s request—consider
doing what is appealed for. Helpfulness in Axiom 1, on the other hand, is more self-
motivated—consider helping if both parties can benefit from it. Hence, Axiom 1 turns
out to be more useful to us for studying proactive behavior.
However, Axiom 1 is still not rich enough to cover helping behaviors involving three
or more parties. Such behaviors occur predominantly in large hierarchical teams with sub-
teams. As illustrated in Fig. 4, suppose agent A1 needs help (described by predicate p);
only agents in subteam 1 know A1’s needs, and there is no teammate in subteam 1 who can
directly satisfy A1. Assume an agent A2 knows that some other agent (say, B1) in another
subteam may be able to directly satisfy A1 by performing action α. In the real case, in order
to be helpful, A2 may consider informing B1 about A1’s needs or requesting that B1 help
A1. However, Axiom 1 cannot give an account for such indirect helping behavior because
it requires that A2 has to believe that the performance of α by B1 ensures that A1’s needs
will be satisfied, which is not the case here. Moreover, A2 may only know that B1 could
indirectly contribute to A1’s needs rather than directly satisfy them. In such cases, B1 may
Fig. 4. An illustration of chain of helping.
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[Int.Th(A,p, t, t ′,Cp)∧ ¬Bel(A,p, t)∧ Lead(A,β,p, t, tβ ,Θβ)] ⇒
Pot.Int.To(A,β, t, tβ ,Θβ ∧Cp), where
Lead(A,β,p, t, tβ ,Θβ) Bel(A,P 1, t)∧ [Bel(A,P2, t)∨ Bel(A,P3, t)], where
P1 = ∃Rβ · CBA(A,β,Rβ, tβ ,Θβ),
P2 = (Do(A,β, tβ ,Θβ) ⇒ p),
P3 = Do(A,β, tβ ,Θβ) ⇒ ψ , where
ψ = [∃B,α,Rα, tα, t ′′· (tα > tβ)∧ (tα > t ′′)∧
CBA(B,α,Rα, tα,Θα)∧
Pot.Int.To(B,α, t ′′, tα,Θα∧ Lead(B,α,p, t ′′, tα,Θα))]
Fig. 5. The axiom characterizing chains of helping behavior.
forward A1’s needs to agent C2 in yet another subteam, knowing that C2 may be able to
contribute. We need to generalize Axiom 1 to cover such chains of helping behavior.
To generalize Axiom 1, we need to redefine the LEAD’ meta-predicate, which re-
quires changing only one clause in the definition of the LEAD’. We choose to define
‘lead-to’ recursively. In so doing, it would seem that by simply replacing the conjunct
“Do(B,α, tα,Θα) ⇒ p” in the definition of the LEAD’ by “LEAD′ (B,α,p, t ′′, tα,Θα)”,
chains of helping behaviors could be explained. But this simply does not work because
it would impose too strong requirements on agents’ beliefs. More specifically, it would
require agent A to believe that the performance of action β can (1) enable agent B to per-
form action α, (2) motivate B to consider doing it (Pot.Int.To), and (3) necessitate B to
adopt beliefs required by LEAD’ with respect to α (since LEAD’ is defined in terms of be-
liefs). However, generally an agent cannot guarantee, even within its beliefs, that its action
can affect others’ beliefs. In this case, even though the performance of β by A could enable
B to perform α, B itself may not be able to realize this.
An alternate approach is to drop “Do(B,α, tα,Θα) ⇒ p” and add a recursion clause to
the intentional context of the Pot.Int.To. The modified axiom is shown in Fig. 5.
The recursive definition of Lead in Fig. 5 states that A believes it can bring about action
β , the performance of which can either result in p, or enable another agent B to do some
action α and motivate B to consider doing α under the context that (1) B believes it can
bring about α, (2) B believes the performance of α can result in p or enable yet another
agent to do some action which can lead to p, and so on. Such a chain of reasoning initiates a
chain of helping behavior which may ultimately satisfy the needer (agent A). The definition
is succinct and neatly combines direct and indirect helping behaviors. The Leads within
the context of Pot.Int.Tos serve as an explanation for the chain of helping behaviors among
agents.
Some would argue for the avoidance of complex nestings of existential quantifiers and
modal belief operators. For instance, in the original SharedPlans theory [42], even deci-
sions that have already been made by a group are modeled implicitly using existential
quantification, which makes it difficult to reason about certain properties. Hunsberger [47]
used SharedPlan Trees as arguments of meta-predicates to reformulate SharedPlans. The
reformulation eliminates certain existential quantifications and thereby allows a set of
important theorems to be proved. However, this is not the case here. The two uses of
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∃Rβ · Bel(A,CBA(A,β,Rβ, tβ,Θβ), t) is much stronger than Bel(A,∃Rβ · CBA(A,β,
Rβ, tβ,Θβ), t). If the former were used, it would require A to hold a same recipe in all
the belief accessible worlds. For the same reason, the second existential quantifier cannot
be moved outside the scope of Bel.
The new definition of Lead does not necessarily cause problems of infinite recursion
either. First, there is a base clause. The recursion terminates whenever an agent can directly
bring about p. Second, the nested reasoning is not typically performed by a single agent
(say, agent A2) but distributed among all the agents involved in the help chain. In system
implementation, it may be sufficient for an agent to consider at most one level of recursion.
For instance, in Fig. 4, agent A2 can help A1 with the information need p if A2 knows B1
can perform some action that can make the state of affairs closer to p without necessarily
knowing that B1 may further ask C2 for help.
Compared with Axiom 1, Axiom 3 can be used to characterize chains of helping in
large agent teams. In particular, it establishes a basis for choosing a third-party commu-
nicative act defined in a later section. Even though third-party communicative acts have
been studied in the Joint Intentions theory [46], in addition to other differences from our
approach (e.g., driven by explicit needs), the Joint Intentions theory does not have such an
axiom from which helping behaviors can be derived (it is the joint intentions that serve as
the motivation to any helping behaviors). Consequently, the Joint Intentions theory lacks a
generic characterization of helping behavior involving three or more parties.
We assume that Axiom 3 holds in belief contexts. In the rest of this article, we also as-
sume that all agents in a team are helpful to others, and use Helpful(A) as a meta-predicate
to refer to Axiom 3.
3.4. Preconditions and social inference trees
Prior to performing a plan or action, an agent typically needs to check whether the plan
or action is both physically and epistemically feasible [30]. In other words, obstacles to
plans or actions come in one of two varieties: physical and informational. Accordingly, we
distinguish physical preconditions from informational preconditions.
For instance, suppose that in a battlefield domain there is a complex action called
RemoveThreat(?e, ?loc, ?dir, ?num). Upon knowing a threat from an enemy unit, the per-
formers of this action may either choose to attack the enemy from the flank, or wait for the
enemy to become exhausted. This RemoveThreat can be represented as:
(MoveToFlank(?e, ?loc, ?dir);Fire(?e, ?num)) |
((FarAway(?e,Self )?;Wait(Self ))∗;Fire(?e, ?num)).
Assume that the preconditions of RemoveThreat involve three pieces: (1) CanFight (Self ):
the agent can fight—this may require the agent to have enough fighting power, to move,
etc.; (2) Threat(?e, ?loc, ?dir, ?num): the agent knows the threat to be removed; and
(3) Outmatch(?e, ?num): the agent knows its own team outnumbers the enemy unit. Here,
for the complex action RemoveThreat, CanFight(Self ) is an example of physical precon-
ditions while Outmatch(?e, ?num) and Threat(?e, ?loc, ?dir, ?num) are kinds of informa-
tional preconditions.
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RemoveThreat overcome the physical obstacles. For instance, if a performer cannot fight,
the other agents could enable the performer by delivering supplies or removing potential
barriers. The other agents can also help the performers of RemoveThreat with the informa-
tional obstacles. For instance, if a performer does not know of an approaching threat, the
other agents could provide threat information to the performer proactively. Since proactive
information delivery is our concern, we will focus on informational preconditions only.
Informational preconditions may also have different varieties. A complex action or plan
may have associated constraints (or preconditions) which have to be satisfied prior to the
action being performed. For instance, suppose prior to removing a threat an agent has to
know whether its own team outnumbers the enemies. In addition, a complex action or plan
may have knowledge preconditions [30,69]: the agent has to know enough to carry out a
plan. Lochbaum [67] recast the observations on knowledge preconditions made by Mor-
genstern [69] into the terminology of the SharedPlans framework. She used the predicates
has.recipe and id.params respectively to represent that (1) agents need to know recipes
(know-how information) for the acts to be performed, and (2) agents must be able to iden-
tify the parameters of the acts to be performed.
Without loss of generality, we assume that agents in working teams already have ap-
plicable recipes for single-agent actions and could exchange meta-level information to
collaboratively construct shared partial recipes for complex actions. To further simplify
the issue of parameter identification, we also assume that the parameters of an action either
have constant values or their values are propagated from a higher-level action (plan) or
can be determined if the preconditions are satisfied. Consequently, the task of parameter
identification for an action (or plan) is reduced to satisfying the preconditions of the ac-
tion (or plan). For example, the parameters of RemoveThreat are determined as soon as the
predicate Threat can be unified successfully with the agent’s belief base.
Now we formally characterize action preconditions. As we mentioned in Section 3.2,
several recipes may be specified for a complex action. Thus, different from Grosz and
Kraus’ treatment [42], we assume that action preconditions depend on recipes. For in-
stance, another recipe for RemoveThreat can be specified as: recruit an echelon unit to
induce the approaching enemy to move away from the crucial area. To carry out this recipe,
the agents recruited to remove the threat also need to know the location of the crucial area,
as well as the pre-requisite information about the approaching enemy. Let Rα be a recipe
for action α, and pre(Rα) be the preconditions specified for Rα . Then we use preA(α)
to denote the set of preconditions associated with any recipe for doing α that A knows
about, i.e., preA(α) =
⋃
Rα∈recipeA(α) pre(Rα).
12 Thus, I ∈ preA(α) simply states that I is
some precondition for some recipe for doing α that A knows about. This will be used in
Section 5.1 to allow an agent to anticipate teammates’ information needs regarding action
α based on those recipes of α known to the agent. In approximately anticipating others’
information needs, an agent A needs to consider all the known recipes for α because (1) A
may not know the sets of recipes for α its teammates are considering, and (2) even if A
12 In case that α is a primitive action, preA(α) refers to the collection of preconditions associated with α.
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teammates are going to choose to perform α.13
In order to facilitate the reasoning of information needs at different levels of abstraction
and to represent the context of inference, we introduce the concept of social inference trees,
which organize predicates in a tree-like structure capturing the hierarchical reasoning as
reflected in agents’ inference knowledge. Generally, a collection of predicates (e.g., action
preconditions, constraints, intentional contexts or preference conditions) can be structured
into a social inference tree.
Continuing with the example from the beginning of this section, suppose that agents’
inference knowledge is represented by Horn clauses, as follows:
(1) Threat is the head predicate of a Horn clause:





That is, the agent could deduce the existence of a threat if it had belief about the identified
enemy unit (IsEnemy), the location of the enemy unit (At), the direction in which the enemy
unit is moving (Dir), and the number of enemies in the unit (Number).
(2) Dir is the head predicate of a Horn clause:
Dir(?e, ?dir)←
[At(?e, ?l1,NOW − 1),
At(?e, ?l2,NOW),
Compass(?l1, ?l2, ?dir)].
That is, to deduce the moving direction, the agent needs to know the change of location,
from which to infer the direction. And
(3) CanFight is the head predicate of a Horn clause:
CanFight(Self ) ← [HaveFP(Self ),CanMove(Self )].
That is, to be able to fight, the agent needs to have enough fighting power, and also be
able to move to the targets. Fig. 6 shows the inference tree constructed for the precon-
ditions of RemoveThreat, where the dotted subtree from node ‘Threat’ will be discussed
later.
13 This may cause computational explosion. Certain strategies can be employed to simplify the reasoning in
implementing practical agent systems. For instance, to reduce the scope of reasoning, agents can record and learn
the most frequently used recipes by its teammates. The social inference trees discussed later in this paper can
also alleviate this problem. However, general approaches to dealing with computational complexity are beyond
the scope of this paper.
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Similar to AND/OR trees [87], a social inference tree is composed of “AND” nodes and
“OR” nodes, where each “OR” node is labeled with a predicate, and every “AND” node
represents one piece of inference knowledge. The truth value of the predicate labeling its
parent OR node can be inferred from the truth values of the predicates labeling its child
nodes. Social inference trees can be generated at compile time and refined at run time to
reflect the dynamics of agents’ inference knowledge.
The notion of social inference trees differs from AND/OR trees in several aspects. First,
agents in a team may have different inference trees due to their differences in inference
capability. Second, each AND node in a social inference tree is associated with a list of
agents who share the corresponding inference knowledge. Such lists play a very impor-
tant role in proactive communications. For instance, knowing a teammate has the same
inference knowledge, an agent may not consider the teammate as a needer of the inferred
information unless being explicitly requested. Moreover, the agent list actually provides
points of contact between information needers and information providers. When an agent
matches the information needs of a teammate with the predicate labeling the parent of an
AND node, the agent can consider initiating a third-party communication action toward
some potential provider in the agent list. Third, each leaf node is associated with a list
of agents who have the ability to observe the information relevant to the predicate label-
ing the node. Knowing the observability of teammates helps an agent find an appropriate
information provider. Fourth, each AND node is associated with a dynamically adjustable
preference value. In cases where a predicate can be inferred multiple ways, the correspond-
ing OR node will have multiple AND nodes as its children. For example, the dotted subtree
in Fig. 6 shows another way of inferring threat from lower-level information. In such cases,
the preference information can be leveraged to guide an agent in its information gathering
and fusing activities. For instance, to minimize inter-agent dependence, an agent may pre-
fer to use the subtree that involves the least number of teammates; to improve robustness,
an agent may prefer to use the subtree where most of the OR nodes have multiple branches.
Consequently, such preference information is useful in circumscribing the scope of reason-
ing in anticipating others’ information needs.
In an inference tree, the nodes at the same level collectively form a context for each
individual. For instance, in Fig. 6, as far as threat identification is concerned, Dir(?e, ?dir)
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Number(?e, ?num). Thus,
{Dir(?e, ?dir), IsEnemy(?e),At(?e, ?loc,NOW),Number(?e, ?num)} (pc1)
collectively establishes a context for each of the individual predicates.
Such contexts at inference level, together with inference trees, can be used in collabo-
rative constraint satisfaction. Suppose that agents A1, A2 and A3 share the inference tree
shown in Fig. 6, and that A3 is the agent of the RemoveThreat action. Assume both A1
and A2 have identified an enemy unit (e1) approaching A3, who is unaware of the threat
from e1. Also assume that A1 can only observe the location and moving direction of e1, as
represented by the predicates At(e1,area4,NOW) and Dir(e1,northeast); A2 can only ob-
serve the enemy number, Number(e1,100), of unit e1. Obviously, neither A1 nor A2 alone
can enable A3 to do RemoveThreat. However, they can collaboratively help A3 because A1
knows that At(e1,area4,NOW) and Dir(e1,northeast) will be useful for A3 in the context
pc1, and A2 knows that Number(e1,100) will be useful for A3 in that context.
Such contexts at inference level can also be used to account for anticipated information
needs and the exchange of incomplete information. Both concepts will be discussed in
Section 4.
3.5. Reformulating performative-as-attempt in the SharedPlans framework
Following the idea of “performative-as-attempt” [21,22], we will model the inten-
tional semantics of proactive performatives to establish certain mutual beliefs between
the speaker and the addressee (or addressees). In order to do that, we first need to refor-
mulate the concept of “attempt” within the framework of the SharedPlans theory. Then,
the semantics of “inform” and “request” are given in terms of attempts. This serves par-
tially to validate our approach of encoding “performative-as-attempt” in the SharedPlans
framework.
Definition 6. Attempt(A, ,P,Q,Cn, t, t1) φ?; , where
φ = [¬Bel(A,P, t)∧
Pot.Int.Th(A,P, t, t1,Cn)∧
Int.Th(A,Q, t, t1,¬Bel(A,P, t)∧Cn)∧
Int.To(A, , t, t,ψ)], where
ψ = Bel(A,post() ⇒ Q, t)∧ Pot.Int.Th(A,P, t, t1,Cn).
Here, P represents some ultimate goal that may or may not be achieved by the attempt
while Q represents what it takes to make an honest effort. The agent has only a limited
commitment (potential intention) to the ultimate goal P , while having a full-fledged in-
tention to achieve Q. More specifically, if the attempt does not achieve the goal P , the
agent may retry the attempt, try some other strategy or even drop the goal. However, if the
attempt does not succeed in achieving the honest effort Q, the agent is committed to retry-
ing (e.g., performing  again) until either Q is achieved, becomes unachievable (time t1
arrives) or irrelevant (the escape condition Cn no longer holds) [21,84]. Thus, the Attempt
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achieve P . Of course, P and Q may refer to the same formula.
For example, if P in the above definition is replaced by Bel(B, I, t), that means that
agent A desires that Bel(B, I, t) hold. While Bel(B, I, t) may be unachievable for A,
MB({A,B},Bel(B, Bel(A, I, t), t1)) (Q in this case) can be achieved by exchanging ap-
propriate messages with B . In case of communication failure in establishing the mutual
belief, A will retry until the mutual belief is achieved, Cn no longer holds or the deadline
t1 comes. Here  may refer to a sequence of send, the act of wrapping the message in a
wire language and physically sending it. When communication is reliable and sincerity is
assumed, one send may suffice.
This definition of attempt differs from the definition of attempt (attempt) from Sec-
tion 2.1.2 as follows.
• It introduces the explicit time-point t1 that represents the deadline to terminate an
attempt. When time t1 arrives, an attempt becomes unachievable, thus the agent is
released from retrying it.
• It includes Cn, which represents the context of an attempt.14 Cn could be a placeholder
in specifying escape conditions for Attempt, as well as describing the relationship be-
tween P and Q.
• It replaces the overly strong clause (BEL A ¬p) with the weaker clause ¬Bel(A,p, t),
which we believe to be more reasonable.
• It uses potential intentions instead of GOALs (used in the earlier definition attempt)
to represent the ultimate goal. This is much flexible because it allows the expression
of situations where an agent has an ultimate goal that may conflict with existing inten-
tions.
• An Int.Th and an Int.To together are used to simulate the term INTEND1 in attempt.
(INTEND1 A t?; ;Q? C) says that A intends to do the action  with the result that Q
holds. To highlight A’s intention that Q hold, we use an Int.Th to represent the chosen
honest goal, and use an Int.To to represent the agent’s intention to do the event  in
the context that it believes the doing of  will make Q true, which is related to the
achievement of the ultimate goal P .
According to speech act theory [81], every speech act has an utterance event associated
with it. For the purposes of this paper, we simply assume that all utterance events are single-
agent complex actions, for which each agent has full individual recipes. For instance, when
the honest goal of a performative is to establish certain mutual beliefs, the recipe for the
corresponding  may involve negotiations, persuasions or failure-handling.
We now formally define the successful doing of an attempt (performative).
Definition 7. SuccDone(A,Attempt(A, ,P,Q,Cn, t0, t1))
∃Θ,∃t ′ · (t0  t ′  t1)∧ Do(A, , t0,Cn ∧Θ)∧ Hold(Q, t ′).
14 Cohen and Levesque [22] argued for such an extra argument.
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was done and the honest goal Q holds at some time before t1.
Let χ(A,B, . . . , t0, t1, . . .) be a communicative act where A is the sender, B is the
receiver, t0 is the time to perform the act, t1 is the deadline. Axiom 4 says that if a perfor-
mative was done then both parties mutually believe that it was done.
Axiom 4. SuccDone(A,χ(A,B, . . . , t0, t1, . . .)) ⇒
∃t ′  t1 · MB({A,B},SuccDone(A,χ(A,B, . . . , t0, t1, . . .)), t ′).
The semantics of elementary performatives is given by choosing appropriate formulas
(involving mutual beliefs) to substitute for P and Q in the definition of Attempt. Inform is
defined as the speaker’s attempt to establish a mutual belief with the addressee about the
speaker’s goal to let the addressee know what the speaker knows.
Definition 8. Inform(A,B, ,p, t, ta) (t < ta)?;Attempt(A, ,P,Q,Cp, t, ta),
where P = MB({A,B},p, ta),
Q = ∃t ′′ · (t  t ′′ < ta)∧ MB({A,B},ψ, t ′′),
Cp = Bel(A,p, t)∧ Bel(A,UBif(B,p, t), t), where
ψ = ∃tb · (t ′′  tb < ta)∧ Int.Th(A,Bel(B,Bel(A,p, t), tb), t, tb,Cp).
This definition re-formulates the definition of inform in Section 2.1.2. When commu-
nication is reliable and agents trust each other, it is easy to establish the mutual belief about
ψ required in the honest goal of Inform: agent B believes ψ upon receiving a message with
content ψ from agent A; A knows this, and B knows A knows this, and so on. Here, un-
like in re-formulating Attempt, we choose to use Int.Th rather than Pot.Int.Th to imitate the
GOAL operator used in the definition of inform in Section 2.1.2. The reason is that the
GOAL in attempt characterizes the speaker’s ultimate goal while the GOAL in inform
reflects the speaker’s honest effort (the least to achieve), which can be better simulated
by Int.Th. Pot.Int.Th is too weak to represent honest goals because potential intentions are
subjected to reconciliation before being adopted as actual intentions. This does not lose
flexibility because an agent can make decisions on communication before actually doing
an Inform.
Fig. 7 shows the order of time points used in the definition of Inform. Both the time t
in Definition 8 and the definition of inform in Section 2.1.2 refer to the same point. ψ
in Definition 8 states that immediately before the performance of  (i.e., at t) A intends
that after  (i.e., at tb) B believes “A believes p before  (i.e., at t)”. Thus, the different
characterizations of time are equivalent in the definitions of Inform and inform.
For all the theorems about communication to be established later, we assume that an
agent will not choose to do anything that could thwart its attempts.
Fig. 7. The order of time points in Inform.
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[∀α, t ′  t1 · Bel(A,CONF(α,Q, t ′, t1,Θα,Cp), t ′)⇒ ¬Do(A,α, t ′,Θα)].
Assumption 3 can be taken as the ‘inertia’ counterpart of Axiom 2 in Fig. 3. While
Axiom 2 states that a sincere agent will try its best to bring about p and keep p holding,
Assumption 3 only requires that an agent not knowingly make p false. More specifically,
suppose that after agent A successfully performs a performative, the honest effort Q holds
at some time point t ′ before the deadline t1. Then, A will not do any action that conflicts
with Q continuing to hold. Because it is assumed in Section 3.1 that beliefs/intentions
persist by default, we can conclude that Q holds until t1 from agent A’s perspective.
Proposition 1. Successful performance of the Inform act establishes between the sender
and the addressee a mutual belief that the sender believes the informed proposition. For-
mally,
|= SuccDone(A, Inform(A,B, ,p, t, ta)) ⇒ MB({A,B},Bel(A,p, t), ta).
Proof. (1) Assume SuccDone(A, Inform(A,B, ,p, t, ta)).
(2) By (1), Definition 7 and Definition 8, there exists a time t1  ta such that
MB({A,B},ψ, t1), where
ψ = ∃tb · (t1  tb < ta)∧ Int.Th(A,Bel(B,Bel(A,p, t), tb), t, tb,Cp).
(3) A is assumed to be sincere, thus by Axiom 2 we have
Int.Th(A,Bel(B,Bel(A,p, t), tb), t, tb,Cp) ⇒
[Bel(A,p, t)∧ Int.Th(A,Hold(p, tb), t, tb,Cp)].
(4) From (2) and (3) we have MB({A,B},Bel(A,p, t), t1).
(5) By Assumption 2, we can conclude that MB({A,B},Bel(A,p, t), ta). 
A request with respect to action α is defined as the speaker’s attempt to make both the
speaker and the addressee believe that the speaker intends that the addressee commit to
performing the action α. We reformulate the definition of request in Section 2.1.2 as:
Definition 9. Request(A,B, ,α, t, ta,Θα)
(t < ta)?;Attempt(A, ,P,Q,Cp, t, ta), where
P = Do(B,α, ta,Θα),
Q= ∃t ′′ · (t  t ′′ < ta)∧ MB({A,B},ψ, t ′′),
Cp = Bel(A,∃Rα · CBA(B,α,Rα, ta,Θα), t)∧
Int.Th(A,Do(B,α, ta,Θα), t, ta,Θα), where
ψ = ∃tb < ta · Int.Th(A, Int.To(B,α, tb, ta,Cp ∧ Helpful(B)), t, tb,Cp).
The Request means that agent A at t has an attempt where (1) the ultimate goal is for
B to perform α at ta , and (2) the honest goal is to establish a mutual belief that agent A
has an intention that agent B commit to performing α. All must be in appropriate contexts.
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the same point. Formula ψ in Definition 9 states that immediately before the performance
of  (i.e., at t), A intends that after  (i.e., at tb), B intends to do α relative to A’s wanting
and B’s being helpful. Thus, the different characterizations of time are equivalent in the
definitions of Request and request.
According to the definition, agent A would be under no obligation to inform B that its
request is no longer valid when A discovers that Cp no longer holds. Smith and Cohen de-
fined another version of Request in terms of a PWAG (persistent weak achievement goal)
rather than an intention [85]. That means, upon discovering that the goal has been achieved
or become impossible to achieve, or that Cp is on longer true, agent A will be left with a
persistent goal to reach mutual belief with B about the achievement or impossibility, which
will free B from the commitment toward A regarding α. Rather than introducing a counter-
part of PWAG into our framework, we prefer to encode such team-level obligations using
an axiomization approach. Axiom 5 states that any agent intending others to be involved in
a team activity should also adopt an intention to release those agents from the obligations
whenever the intentional context no longer holds.
Axiom 5. |= [Int.Th(A, Int.To(B,α, t1, tα,Cp ∧C′), t, t1,Cp)∧
(t < t1 < tα)∧ Bel(A,¬Cp, t)] ⇒
Int.To(A, Inform(A,B, ,¬Cp, t, t1), t, t,C), where
C = Int.Th(A, Int.To(B,α, t1, tα,Cp ∧C′)∧ Bel(A,¬Cp, t).
The semantics associated with the receipt of a Request is a bit involved. In addition to
realizing that the sender wishes him/her to commit to the action, the receiver can make
certain deductions based upon knowledge of the semantics of Request. In particular, the
receiver may deduce that the sender believes that there is a recipe the receiver could be
following that would lead the receiver to bring about α. Note that the Request does not
indicate which recipe the receiver should follow, only that the sender believes one exists.
This is sufficient, though it does not guarantee that the receiver will actually perform α.
If the receiver is not directly aware of such a recipe, it could lead the receiver to initiate a
search for an appropriate recipe. If the receiver cannot find one as the sender expected, the
receiver could free himself from the obligation and let the sender know the reason.
It is worth noting that action contracting is one important case Grosz and Kraus con-
sidered in defining SharedPlans [42]. Request is very useful in developing communication
protocols that allow agents to contract out actions to others.
4. Information needs
4.1. Information and incomplete information
Information is defined in WordNet Dictionary as a message received and understood
that reduces the recipient’s uncertainty. We adopt the definition described in the Open
Archival Information System (OAIS) [70]: information is “any type of knowledge that can
be exchanged, and it is always represented by some type of data”.
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which is used in FIPA [1] to identify objects in the appropriate domain of discourse. For
any n-ary predicate symbol p, it will be written in the form p( ?x, c), where ?x is a set of
variables and c is a set of constants in appropriate domains. For example,
authorship({?f, ?h, ?m, ?v}, ‘Reasoning about knowledge’)
represents that “Who are the four authors of the book Reasoning about knowledge”.
IRE is written using one of three referential operators defined in the FIPA specification,
as follows:
(1) (iota ?x p( ?x, c )) refers to “the collection of objects, which maps one-to-one to vari-
ables in ?x and there is no other solution, such that p is true of the objects”; the term
is undefined if for any variable in ?x no object or more than one object can satisfy p
(together with substitutions for other variables);
(2) (all ?x p( ?x, c )) refers to “the collection of sets of all objects that satisfy p; each set
(could be an empty set) corresponds one-to-one to a variable in ?x”; and
(3) (any ?x p( ?x, c )) refers to “any collection of objects, which maps one-to-one to vari-
ables in ?x, such that p is true of the objects”; it is undefined if no collection of objects
(substituents of variables in ?x) can satisfy p.
For simplicity of notation, we will omit the operator any when the context is clear and
its absence will cause no confusion. Hence, expressions of the form (any ?x p( ?x, c ))
can be simplified to p( ?x, c ). These three forms of IREs are expressive enough to specify
agents’ needs for information regarding the values of parameters in a formula.
Throughout this paper, we consider two forms of information: factual information and
referential information. A factual information refers to a fact while a referential informa-
tion may refer to a collection of facts. For instance, “Tom has done his homework” is a
factual information, and “Who have done their homework–Tom and Tim” is a referential
information. Factual information is represented by a proposition (a predicate with constant
arguments). Referential information is represented by clauses of the form, Refer(ire,obj),
where ire is an identifying reference expression, and obj is the set of objects bound to the
variables in ire. In the following, we will use I (I ′, I1, . . .) to represent the information to
be communicated. When I refers to a proposition, the sender is informing the receivers that
the predicate is true. When I refers to Refer(ire,obj), the sender is informing the receivers
that obj contains the collection (of sets) of objects that satisfy the p to which the ire refers
according to the sender’s belief base.
Information can be classified along several dimensions. For instance, we can distin-
guish quasi-static information which seldom changes once acquired (e.g., recipes for ac-
tions) from dynamic information. Depending on how information is acquired, there are
observable information, computable information (e.g., by inference rules), and a priori
information (common domain knowledge). We mainly focus on dynamic, observable in-
formation.
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Normally, in referential information, all the variables are bound to values, e.g.,
Refer(threat(e1, ?loc, ?dir, ?num), (area1, south,100)). In multi-agent systems, informa-
tion exchange also involves incomplete information (with unbound variables). This is of
special significance in teamwork settings. For instance, in generating shared plans [43],
parameter identification for team activities depends on the exchange of incomplete infor-
mation.
Hence, we assume agents are capable of recording and manipulating incomplete infor-
mation.15 For example, suppose that in agent B’s belief base, agent A is in the northeast
and there is a piece of incomplete information: threat(e,area4,northeast, ?num), which
means that agent B has observed an enemy unit e with an unknown number of enemies in
area 4, moving northeast. There are many reasons for exchanging incomplete information
rather than waiting until it becomes complete: agent B may never be able to get the num-
ber of e for lack of observability; agent A may already have the number of e from another
teammate; A may be able to deal with the threat even when it is incompletely specified,
etc.
Given a predicate symbol p, if p(?v1, . . . , ?vi, c1, . . . , cj ) belongs to agent A’s belief
base, it means that agent A believes that there exist some unknown objects ?vm (1m
i), which together with the already identified objects cn (1 n j), have the relation p.
Generally, in a piece of incomplete information p, it is not necessary that all the constant
arguments of p come after all the variable arguments (not being identified yet). In addition,
a variable could occur more than once in p when p denotes a complex relation. For ex-
ample, suppose p1(?x, ?y, ?z) denotes such a relation: ?x is a logistics person, ?y is in the
army, and ?z is a relative of both ?x and ?y. As the state of affairs changes, agent A may
acquire information p1(?x, ?x,Aaron), which means that A believes that Aaron has a rel-
ative who is a logistics person in the army. Thus, to simplify the following discussion, we
assume that any incomplete information can be represented in a normative form H(v, c ),
where v and c are vectors of variable identifiers and constant identifiers respectively, such
that (1) the original multiple appearances of variables or constants are removed; and (2) the
order of elements in v and c does not matter. For example, p1(?x, ?x,Aaron) can be nor-
malized as p1({?x}, {Aaron}). We also assume certain mapping information is preserved
in the normative representation so that normative incomplete information can be properly
de-normalized.16
Social inference trees (cf. Section 3.4) can be leveraged to generate incomplete infor-
mation. For example, the social inference tree pictured in Fig. 6 can be used to gener-
ate threat(e,area4,northeast, ?num) by fusing the information: IsEnemy(e), At(e,area4),
Dir(e,northeast). Also, several pieces of incomplete information can be combined if
they are complementary. Continuing the above example, suppose agent A also gets an-
other incomplete threat threat(e, ?loc, ?dir,100) from agent C (i.e., the enemy unit e
has 100 enemies, but their location and moving direction are unknown to C). Then
threat(e,area4,northeast,100) can be derived by A.
15 In implementation, the inference engine should treat incomplete information and complete information (e.g.,
facts) separately.
16 In essence, the normalization can be achieved solely by defining new predicate symbols.
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An information need may state that the agent needs to know the truth value of a propo-
sition. For instance, suppose a person sends a query Weather(Cloudy,Today) to a weather
station. The weather station will realize that the person wants to know, at least literally,17
whether it is cloudy today. More often than not, an agent may want any information that
matches his/her constraints, rather than simply querying whether a specific proposition is
true or false. In particular, an agent may want to know the values of some arguments of a
predicate that would make the predicate true [87]. For example, a person may send a query
Weather(?x,Today) to a weather station. This will trigger the weather personnel, if will-
ing to be helpful, to inform the person about a change in the weather conditions whenever
necessary.
Thus, in regard to information, an expression of information needs may also be in one of
two forms: a factual proposition or a reference expression (which actually specifies a class
of information). In what follows, N is used to refer to an information need-expression, and
pos(N) (ref (N)) is true if N is a proposition (reference expression).
Now we come to the representation of information needs. Obviously, an information
need should specify the need-expression as well as the information consumer (needer).
Typically, a need becomes meaningless after a certain point when some event happens.
For instance, an agent may no longer need to know the location of enemy units e if e
has already been defeated. Thus, information needs often have an associated time limit. In
addition, a need is only applicable in certain contexts. The contexts of a need may serve as
relativizing conditions [56] or describe the reason for adopting the need. For instance, the
context of an information need may include the context of the needer’s relevant intentions.
Those teammates who know the information need of some agent will consider helping the
agent as long as the context of the information need remains true. Later, the contexts of
information needs will be considered in transforming information needs of teammates to
intentions to assist them (refer to Section 6). The contexts also will be used in constructing
the contexts for need-driven communicative actions (refer to Section 7,8).
To combine the above factors, a modal operator InfoNeed(A,N, t,Cn) is introduced to
represent information needs. In cases where N is a proposition, the operator means that
agent A needs to know the truth value of N by t under the context Cn; in cases where N is
a reference expression, the operator means agent A needs to know those objects that satisfy
the reference expression N .
Note that for at least two reasons the notion of information needs cannot be defined
simply as intentions of beliefs, say Int.Th(A,Bel(A, I, t ′), t, tb,Cn). First, since the Int.Th
operator is subject to numerous axioms (e.g., axioms constraining which other intentions
an agent might subsequently adopt), using Int.Th to represent an information need might
be too restrictive. For instance, without InfoNeed, it is cumbersome to clearly express the
situation where an agent has an information need of which the agent is unaware. Second, an
intention-that involves a commitment to means-ends reasoning which may be inapplicable
to mere information needs. Moreover, suppose that Q = Int.Th(A,Bel(A, I, t ′), t, tb, Cn)
17 Except for indirect speech acts [80].
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(IN2) |= InfoNeed(A,N, t ′,Cn)≡ InfoNeed(A,¬N, t ′,Cn), where
N is a proposition;
(IN3) |= InfoNeed(A,H( ?x, c ), t ′,Ci)⇒
∀?y ∈ ?x,∀k ∈ dom(?y,H( ?x, c )) · InfoNeed(A,H( ?x\?y, c ⊕ k), t ′,Ci);
(IN4) |= InfoNeed(A,N1 ∧N2, t ′,Ci) ⇒
InfoNeed(A,N1, t ′,Ci)∧ InfoNeed(A,N2, t ′,Ci);
(IN5) |= InfoNeed(A,N1 ∨N2, t ′,Ci) ⇒
InfoNeed(A,N1, t ′,Ci)∧ InfoNeed(A,N2, t ′,Ci);
(IN6) |= InfoNeed(A,N1, t ′,Ci)∧ (N2 ⇒ N1) ⇒ InfoNeed(A,N2, t ′,Ci), where
N2 ≡ False;
(IN7) |= Bel(A,H( ?x, c ), t) ⇒ Bel(A,∃t ′,C′ · InfoNeed(A,H( ?x, c ), t ′,C′), t).
Fig. 8. The axioms characterizing InfoNeed: IN1–IN7.
represents an information need of agent A, and Bel(B,Q, t) holds. Then, agent B would
not choose to help A, considering that agent A itself could commit to certain means-ends
reasoning to acquire I (e.g., ask some other teammate). To enable B to help A in such a
case, it is desirable to introduce the InfoNeed operator.
In the rest of this section, instead of providing an explicit semantics for InfoNeed, we
choose to give an axiomatization for it. First, InfoNeed is closed temporally into the past.
Axiom IN1 in Fig. 8 states that, if an agent has a need regarding N by t ′, it also needs N
any time before t ′. However, as far as proactive communication is concerned, only ‘future’
needs make sense. Thus, when Axiom IN1 is applied, only the needs backward up to the
current time t are considered.
Axiom IN2 states that in the case where the need-expression is a proposition, the infor-
mation need is insensitive to negation.
To explain Axiom IN3, we first define the notations to be used. Given a vector o of
identifiers and any identifier d , define
o \ d 
{
(o1, . . . , oi, oi+1, . . . , ok) if o = (o1, . . . , oi, d, oi+1, . . . , ok),
o if d not occur in o,
o⊕ d 
{
(o1, . . . , ok, d) if o = (o1, . . . , ok),
(d) if o if empty.
Given P( ?x, c ) and ?y ∈ ?x, let dom(?y,P ( ?x, c )) be the value domain of the variable ?y
with respect to the predicate P . That is, dom(?y,P ( ?x, c )) is a set of values such that, if
any of the values is substituted for ?y, there will still be values for the rest of the variables
in ?x that will make P true.
Axiom IN3 states that for information needs involving reference need-expressions
or normalized incomplete information, abstract needs imply more concrete needs. For
example, if agent B knows that agent A needs information about threats of the form
Threat(?e, ?loc, ?dir, ?num), B may rationally assume that A is also interested in more
concrete information like: Threat(e1, ?loc, ?dir,100), even though the information is still
incomplete.
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junction because the truth value of N1 ∨ N2 may depend on the truth values of both N1
and N2.
Axioms IN6 states that weaker information needs entail stronger ones. For example,
believing that agent B needs N1 and “N2 ⇒ N1” is commonly known, it is rational for
agent A to assume that B also needs N2. Otherwise, B could have derived N1 by itself.
However, Axioms IN6 is actually too strong; it implies that agent A needs all unsatisfiable
formulas. But on the other hand, it is acceptable in practical reasoning systems if an agent
is prohibited from applying Axiom IN6 to an inference rule when the antecedent is found
unsatisfiable.
Oftentimes, an agent may get incompletely specified information from its teammates,
who believe the beneficiary agent will need the information even though it is incomplete.
If an agent really needs the information which is currently of incomplete form, the agent
can generate an information needs from the incompletely specified information so that it
can refine the information when the missing part becomes available later. Axiom IN7 states
that an agent can derive information needs by reflecting on incomplete information (e.g.,
reference expressions in which ?x is not empty).
In general, an agent may not be able to figure out its own information needs for many
reasons (e.g., lack of inference knowledge). Thus, we have
InfoNeed(A,N, t ′,Ci) ⇒ Bel(A, InfoNeed(A,N, t ′,Ci), t),
¬InfoNeed(A,N, t ′,Ci) ⇒ Bel(A,¬InfoNeed(A,N, t ′,Ci), t).
More axioms will be introduced in later sections. Those axioms can be taken as character-
izations of the relationships between InfoNeed, Bel, and intentions.
We now define a generated set. For any set of formula C, let Needs(C) be a set of
need-expressions generated from C:
1. p ∈ Needs(C), if p ∈ C is a proposition;
2. (any ?x p( ?x, c )) ∈ Needs(C), if p( ?x, c ) ∈ C.18
For example, given a set
C = {IsEnemy(?e),At(?e, ?loc),HaveSupply(Self ))},
then
Needs(C) = {(any ?e IsEnemy(?e)),
(any (?e ?loc) At(?e, ?loc)),
HaveSupply(Self )}.
18 Depending on domains, need-expressions of the form (iota ?x p( ?x, c )) or (all ?x p( ?x, c )) can also be
generated. For instance, if α is a joint action where some doer should be exclusively identified, an iota expression
is preferred. An all expression is suitable if all objects that can be substituted for variables in ?x will be needed
in the performance of α.
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we write NeedsA(α) to refer to Needs(preA(α)), where A is an agent. The generated need-
expression sets will be used in Section 5 to derive the information needs anticipated for
teammates.
4.3. Levels of information needs
The notion of social inference tree (cf. Section 3.4) helps in handling levels of informa-
tion needs. Because of the axioms IN6 and IN4 (cf. Fig. 8) of InfoNeed, there may exist
information needs at different levels but for the same purpose. For instance, suppose agent
A recognized that an enemy unit e is approaching agent B , who needs to react to the threat
(say, perform RemoveThreat) no later than time t ′. Now assume that agent A believes
InfoNeed(B,Threat(e, ?loc, ?dir, ?num), t ′,C),
where C records A’s explanation for the need. Then, by Axiom IN6, A will believe
InfoNeed(B, IsEnemy(e) ∧ At(e, ?loc) ∧ Dir(e, ?dir) ∧ Number(e, ?num), t ′,C), and by
Axiom IN4, A will also believe
InfoNeed(B, IsEnemy(e), t ′,C), InfoNeed(B,At(e, ?loc), t ′,C),
InfoNeed(B,Dir(e, ?dir), t ′,C), InfoNeed(B,Number(e, ?num), t ′,C).
Such proliferation process may continue in a top-down way along the inference tree and
result in several levels of information needs. Redundant assistance may occur if A attempts
to satisfy all these information needs.
Here, social inference trees can be leveraged to preclude the consideration of redundant
information needs. The idea is to consider information needs first from the most abstract
level. Only when an agent cannot satisfy the information needs at level i (i.e., there is
critical information unknown),19 will it consider those needs at level i + 1.
For the example shown in Fig. 6, suppose that, as the doer of RemoveThreat,
agent B needs threat information, and agent A has identified an enemy unit: Bel(A,
IsEnemy(e1), t). To help B with its information needs about threat, A can first check
whether Threat(e1, ?loc, ?dir, ?num) holds or not. Assume that A’s belief base includes
facts: At(e1,area2,NOW), Dir(e1,north), and Number(e1,80) (which may be observed
by A itself or informed by others). Then A could successfully identify a threat by fusing
the lower-level information together. In such a case, A can simply deliver the identified
threat information to B , instead of going further to satisfy B’s lower-level information
needs along the inference tree.
In complex cases, an agent may choose to deliver information to satisfy a needer’s in-
formation needs at multiple levels. Continue the above example, assuming that A’s belief
base only includes information: At(e1,area2,NOW) and Number(e1,80). In this case, A
could only identify an incomplete threat Threat(e1,area2, ?dir,80). As well as delivering
this incomplete information to B , A may want to figure out what hindered it from inferring
information regarding the enemy’s moving direction, and to help satisfy B’s lower-level
19 When incomplete information is allowed, an agent can partially satisfy an information need.
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trees, and breadth-first algorithms can be designed such that agents will not offer redundant
assistance regarding others’ information needs. Hierarchically considering others’ infor-
mation needs is of great significance especially when information consumers only have
limited cognitive capacity, because it allows information consumers to always consider
higher-level information first and ignore the less important or irrelevant information upon
being overloaded.
4.4. Types of information needs in agent teamwork
A team is a set of agents having a shared objective and a shared mental state [25].
In the SharedPlans theory, shared objectives are given in terms of intentions-that (a team’s
wanting to do a certain team action), and shared mental states are reflected by partial shared
plans (PSP) and full shared plans (FSP). As well as establishing requisite mutual beliefs
and ensuring the satisfaction of shared objectives, communication in effective agent teams
also plays a central role in satisfying others’ information needs. In agent teamwork, we
distinguish four types of information needs usually emerging in the pursuit of team or
individual goals.
Action-performing information need. This type of information needs enables an agent to
perform simple or complex actions, the performance of which can contribute to the whole
team. Typically, an action-performing information need is derived from the preconditions
of the action. For instance, in the example given in Section 3.4, Threat is a kind of action-
performing information need with respect to action RemoveThreat.
Decision-making information need. As well as domain actions, those information needs
emerging in the mental action decision-making are of particular interest. Without loss of
generality, we assume complex recipes (e.g., for team activities) may contain ‘decision-
points’, and a decision-point can have several branches specifying alternative courses of
action (COA) that agents can follow to achieve a certain goal. In the terminology of the
SharedPlans theory, each potential choice (i.e., COA) of a decision-point can be taken as a
potential intention, and a decision maker agent ought to select one from the collection of
potential intentions and upgrade it to a full-fledged intention. The reasoning about decision-
making information needs allows team members to help the decision maker select a better
course of action.
Typically, each branch of a decision-point can be associated with some preference con-
straints. For instance, in reactive planning [7], preference criteria can be specified for each
of the plans achieving the same goal. The collection of preference constraints involved
in a decision-point are important factors that affect the quality of decision making; the
more information relevant to the preference constraints is available, the better the decision
maker can evaluate the potential options. For instance, in fire-rescue domains, firefighters
normally use water to extinguish fires. Suppose a building containing materials that react
with water is on fire. It is crucial firefighters know of the contents so that they can choose
a better course of action.
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tect a goal (intention-that) from becoming unachievable. Information regarding potential
threats to the accomplishment of a committed goal belongs to this category; knowing such
information will help an agent adjust its behavior to remove or avoid the threat. For in-
stance, suppose that the goal of a logistics unit is to transport ammunition to the front, and
approaching enemy units pose a threat to the accomplishment of the logistics unit’s goal.
Then, the information about the enemy units (e.g., moving direction) is needed by the lo-
gistics unit to protect its goal. Knowing the approaching threat, the logistics unit could
adjust its supply route to keep its goal achievable.
Information about conflicts between potential intentions and full-fledged intentions also
belongs in this category; knowing such information will help an agent rationally postpone
or drop those potential intentions that may cause conflicts. For instance, suppose that an
agent has an intention to achieve p by doing action α, and at the same time it has a potential
intention to do action β . Knowing that there exists a resource conflict between α and β will
enable the agent to drop the potential intention, which, if adopted as an intention, would
impede the achievement of p.
Goal-escape information need. Because a goal ultimately becomes achieved, unachiev-
able or irrelevant [20], this type of information is needed by an agent to drop impossible
or irrelevant goals. A goal is achievable and relevant only when its context holds. Thus,
typically goal-escape information needs can be derived from the context of the goal under
concern. If any part of a goal context no longer holds, an agent who observed this fact
needs to inform the other teammates involved in pursuing the same goal, so that they can
abandon this impossible or irrelevant goal.
5. Anticipating information needs
To proactively deliver information to teammates, the information providers should be
aware of the teammates’ information needs. There are at least two ways to achieve this.
An information provider can wait for the information consumers’ articulation of their in-
formation needs. Alternatively, a provider can proactively anticipate teammates’ potential
information needs based on certain shared mental models.
The concept of recipes in the SharedPlans theory offers us the basis for studying agents’
capabilities of anticipating teammates’ information needs. In this section, we propose some
axiom schemas for agents to anticipate the different types of information needs identified
in the previous section. The ways of anticipating others’ information needs proposed here
lay the foundation for developing algorithms for agents to reason dynamically about infor-
mation needs of their teammates.
5.1. Action-performing information needs
Oftentimes an agent cannot proceed due to obstacles to individual or team actions. Here
we focus on informational obstacles, which refer to the prerequisite information for per-
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∀A,B ∈ T ⊆ TA, α,Cα, γ, t, t ′  t,∀N ∈ NeedsA(α),∀Rγ ∈ recipe(γ ),
1. Bel(A, Int.To(B,α, t, t ′,Cα), t) ⇒ Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn1), t),
2. [Bel(A,Pot.Int.To(B,α, t, t ′,Cα), t)∧
Bel(A,has.recipe(T , γ,Rγ , t)∧ α ∈ Rγ , t)] ⇒
Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn2), t), where
Cn1 = Cα ∧ Int.To(B,α, t, t ′,Cα),
Cn2 = Cα ∧ has.recipe(T , γ,Rγ , t)∧ α ∈ Rγ ∧ Pot.Int.To(B,α, t, t ′,Cα).
Fig. 9. The axiom for deriving action-performing information needs.
forming an action, and we assume they are specified as part of the preconditions of the
action.
Intuitively, we say that an agent A can anticipate that another agent B will need to
know the pre-requisite information for performing an action if A recognizes that B has
a (possibly potential) intention to do that action. Formally, Axiom 6 in Fig. 9 states that
agent A believes that agent B will need the information described by N by time t ′, if
A believes that B is (potentially) intending to perform action α at time t ′ under context
Cα . The context of the information need consists of Cα and B’s (potential) intention to
perform α.
To justify this axiom, some issues deserve further explanation. First, Axiom 6 should
not be understood as “any agent that might end up doing an action is considered to have a
(potential) intention to do that action”. An agent could do actions either reactively or delib-
eratively. Axiom 6 just offers one way for an agent to anticipate others’ action-performing
information needs. Knowing others’ intentions or potential intentions helps the anticipa-
tion. Otherwise, an agent cannot help teammates unless being explicitly requested to do
so.
The second question is how an agent gets to know others’ intentions. We assume agents
in TA as a team are either evolving or acting on some shared plans that have been collab-
oratively generated for some team task. After members of a team have agreed with each
other on some specific recipe for doing an action, even though they individually might have
different partial views of the recipe, each of them should have some minimum knowledge
regarding the evolving recipe. Such knowledge could include the decomposition (at least
at the immediate next level [47]) of the actions he/she is committed to or is jointly com-
mitted to with teammates. An agent could also know who are the assigned doers of already
resolved subactions, as well as the performance sequence of those subactions. Therefore,
an agent can infer the actual intentions-to from his/her partial view of the recipe-tree on
which all the teammates are working.
An agent could also infer teammates’ potential intentions-to from the evolving shared
recipe they are working on. A critical point made in the SharedPlans theory is that planning
is interleaved with acting. Usually, a group of agents may not have a complete plan until
after they have done some of the actions in the partial recipe [42]. This means agents
can act on partial recipes although there are some actions that still need to be resolved
(e.g., through task allocation) or decomposed further. For those unresolved actions, an
anticipating agent cannot surely know who will be the actual performers; the best it can
X. Fan et al. / Artificial Intelligence 169 (2005) 23–97 61do is to assume that all those agents with the requisite capability would be the potential
performers. Thus, the anticipating agent could imagine that all the potential performers
of an unresolved subaction are potentially intending to do the subaction. Note that these
potential intentions may only exist in the anticipating agent’s imagination, which serves to
activate the anticipating agent to provide help proactively. Also, not all potential intentions
are useful in deriving information needs. Part 2 of Axiom 6 requires that agent A infer
agent B’s action-performing information needs only if B’s potential intention is relevant
to a shared recipe of some team activity γ that involves both A and B . In other words, the
action α should be part of Rγ .
Based on the above discussion, the following axiom is added to our framework to allow
agents to derive teammates’ potential intentions.
Axiom 7. ∀A,B ∈ T ⊆ TA, α, γ, t, tα  t,∀Rγ ∈ recipe(γ ),∀Rα ∈ recipe(α)·
[Bel(A,has.recipe(T , γ,Rγ , t), t)∧
Bel(A,α ∈ Rγ , t)∧
Bel(A,CBA(B,α,Rα, tα,Θα), t)] ⇒
Bel(A,Pot.Int.To(B,α, t, tα,Cα), t),20 where
Cα = Θα ∧ has.recipe(T , γ,Rγ , t)∧ α ∈ Rγ .
Third, different agents may have different recipes for an action. Even though agents do
share some recipes, an agent may not know exactly which recipe will be used by another
agent to achieve its goal. We relax this in Axiom 6 by letting the anticipating agent only
consider those recipes it is aware of (refer to the definition of preA(α) and NeedsA(α)).
This means, an agent is only using information it has about α to determine the information
needs of others. One drawback is that the anticipated information needs may not reflect the
real information needs. This can be improved by allowing agents to exchange expertise on
recipes. On the other hand, as a helping behavior, anticipating others’ information needs
does not always have to be precise. In cases where the beneficiary agent realizes its needs
were incorrectly predicted, it may trigger certain conversation sessions, which allow the
anticipating agent to refine its model regarding others’ information needs.
Fourth, Axiom 6 indicates that an agent may generate one information need for any
need-expression in NeedsA(α). Whenever communication bandwidth permits, the axiom
could be leveraged to enhance team-wide situation awareness. However, most multi-agent
systems only have restricted communication bandwidth. Moreover, according to the defi-
nition of Needs, the set of need-expressions generated for an action could be large. Thus,
certain assumptions common to all the teammates need to be employed to preclude un-
necessary assistance. As far as action-performing is concerned, an agent may not proceed
when lacking some prerequisite information for performing an action; it may simply wait
until more information becomes available (e.g., being informed by teammates). Thus, if
“wait” is taken as a common assumption among team members, it is unnecessary for team-
mates to inform an action performer of the negation of information related to the action
20 It is possible that agent A may be informed that agent B had already discarded the COA involving α for some
reason (e.g., due to actions/intentions conflicts). A weaker version of Axiom 7 can be given to incorporate such a
possibility.
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ing α. Agent B need not inform A about ¬p when it believes p is false. Alternatively,
an agent may proceed even lacking some prerequisite information. If this is commonly
assumed, agent B may want to let A know ¬p, hoping that A could then choose a more
appropriate recipe.
On the other hand, even though the set of anticipated information needs is large, an
agent may not service all of them using proactive communications. In practice, a decision
theoretic approach can be employed to achieve selective communication [91]. Such de-
cisions can be influenced by various factors including the possibility that the prospective
beneficiary agent already knows the information, the possible side-effects (e.g., overheard
by opponents) of sending the information, and the cost of communication bandwidth.
However, deciding on whether to help others with the anticipated information needs is
very complex in its own right and, in general, beyond what is considered in this pa-
per.
Fifth, the contexts, Cn1 and Cn2, in Axiom 6 are composed of agent B’s (potential)
intention under A’s concern and the context of the (potential) intention. This is easy to
justify because the anticipated information need will make no sense if A no longer be-
lieves B has the (potential) intention, or from A’s viewpoint, the (potential) intention is
no longer relevant. One thing worth noting here is that in Axiom 6 the context Cα actu-
ally refers to A’s estimation, which may be different from the actual intentional context of
B . The question is to what extent an agent could approximate its teammates’ intentional
contexts. In the pursuit of higher-level joint goals, there are various reasons for an agent
to hold a (potential) intention. In Section 3.2, we identified four possible uses of contexts:
constraints, trace of explanation, attention management, and social specification. Among
these four components, the social specification part of Cα is typically taken as common
knowledge to the whole team; the trace of explanation part can be better estimated in cases
where both A and B are working on the same team activity (i.e., they have shared plans
and shared recipes). However, it is harder for an agent to approximate the constraints and
the attention-management parts because normally they depend on the intention holder it-
self. Sharing intentions or learning meta-information regarding teammates’ capabilities,
capacities or strategies helps in improving the approximation.
The following lemma indicates that under certain contexts, an agent can anticipate oth-
ers’ action-performing information needs from their intentions-that.
Lemma 1. ∀A,B ∈ T ⊆ TA, ∀φ,α, γ,Cφ,Θα, t , t ′  t , t ′′  t ′, ∀N ∈ NeedsA(α),
∀Rγ ∈ recipe(γ )·
[Bel(A, Int.Th(B,φ, t, t ′′,Cφ), t)∧
Bel(A,has.recipe(T , γ,Rγ , t)∧ α ∈ Rγ , t)∧
Bel(A,¬Bel(B,φ, t), t)∧
Bel(A,Lead(B,α,φ, t, t ′,Θα), t)]
⇒ Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t), where
Cn = Θα ∧Cφ ∧ has.recipe(T , γ,Rγ , t)∧ α ∈ Rγ ∧ Pot.Int.To(B, α, t, t ′,Θα ∧Cφ).
Proof. Bel(A,Pot.Int.To(B,α, t, t ′,Θα ∧ Cφ), t) follows from the antecedents and Ax-
iom 3. Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t) follows from Axiom 6(2).
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∀A,B ∈ TA, φ,Cφ, t, t ′  t, t ′′ > t ′,N,Ω·
[Bel(A,N ∈ reckonA(B,Ω,φ), t)∧
(
∧
αi∈Ω [Bel(A,Pot.Int.To(B,αi , t, t ′,Cαi ), t)∧
Bel(A, Int.Th(B,φ, t, t ′′,Cφ) ∈ Cαi , t)])] ⇒
Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t), where
Cn = Cφ ∧ Int.Th(B,φ, t, t ′′,Cφ)∧
∧
αi∈Ω Pot.Int.To(B,αi , t, t
′,Cαi ).
Fig. 10. The axiom for deriving decision-making information needs.
5.2. Decision-making information needs
An agent A may be able to recognize the information needs of another agent B if A
knows B is facing a critical point for choosing its next course of action. This happens
when A knows the possible choices B is considering, and A knows some information that
may help B make a better decision. Being helpful, A will assume B needs the information.
For example, suppose in fire-rescue domains, N is has_chemical(T 1,M1), which
means the building T 1 contains a chemical material M1 that can produce noxious vapor
when reacting with water. As an engineer of the building, A knows the fact N . But the fire-
fighters, who use water to extinguish fires by default even though they have different means
to choose from, are unaware of this fact. Herein, the firefighters have a goal to put out the
fire on T 1 with minimum loss and have a potential intention to extinguish the fire using
water. In such a case, A is obligated to let the fighters know N , so that they can drop the
potential intention of extinguishing the fire using water and adopt another means instead.
Let Ω denote the set of possible choices (i.e., complex actions) of a decision point,
and each candidate action in Ω be associated with certain cues.21 The more informa-
tion regarding these cues that is available, the better an agent can evaluate the utility
of choosing this option. In general, we use reckon(B,Ω,φ) to refer to the set of infor-
mation (need-expressions generated from cues associated with the actions in Ω) used
by B in evaluating the utilities of choices with respect to the goal state φ, and we use
reckonA(B,Ω,φ) to refer to A’s approximation of reckon(B,Ω,φ) based on what is
known to agent A about the decision point. The need-expressions in reckonA(B,Ω,φ) will
be evaluated with respect to agent A’s knowledge. For example, suppose backup(α, ?num)
is in reckonA(B,Ω,φ), where α ∈ Ω . This means that agent A believes knowing how
many teammates can backup α is a factor for B in deciding whether to choose to do α.
Agent A can take backup(α, ?num) as agent B’s information need associated with the
decision point, and consider helping B with the relevant information acquired through
evaluating backup(α, ?num) according to agent A’s belief base.
Axiom 8 in Fig. 10 states that in cases where agent A believes that agent B is consider-
ing several potential actions in its pursuit of some adopted commitment φ, A will assume
B will need information N ∈ reckonA(B,Ω,φ). Here, A is assuming that B needs N be-
cause that is what A would need to evaluate the actions toward achieving φ. The context
21 Such cues may include the availability of requisite resources, the number of teammates that can provide
back-up behavior upon failure, the possible side effects on joint goals, as well as domain-dependent ones.
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Axiom 8 is useful for an agent to help a teammate evaluate multiple (typically exclu-
sive) potential intentions to see which one works better in fulfilling the teammate’s goals.
This to some extent generalizes the approach used in GPGP [31], where agents provide
information to a local scheduler which can then construct better schedules.
5.3. Goal-protection information needs
We formally characterize two types of information needs that allow an agent to protect
a committed goal from becoming unachievable.
The first type of goal-protection information needs is related to internal threats: lacking
such information, an agent may act in an irrational way that would prohibit fulfilling its
chosen goal. The information that will be needed to reconcile a potential intention with an
already adopted intention is of special interest to this paper.
Axiom 9 in Fig. 11 says that agent A will assume agent B needs to know N if A
knows (1) B has a chosen goal φ and the potential intention to do action α, and (2) if N
holds, B’s doing α will make φ impossible. Knowing N will allow agent B to maintain
the achievability of φ by dropping the potential intention to do α. This axiom is quite
interesting because it states how an agent can help a teammate in reconciling conflicts
between potential intentions and adopted intentions, which is a critical issue in evolving
shared plans [43].
To give a concrete example. Suppose Eric is committed to giving an invited talk at a con-
ference from 10 a.m. to 12 a.m. on some day next month (i.e., Int.Th(Eric, talk_happened, t,
10, last(1h))), and he happens to have a routine lab meeting scheduled from 9 a.m. to 11
Axiom 9 (Goal-Protection Information Needs—Type 1).
∀A,B ∈ TA, φ,Cφ, t, t ′  t, t ′′ > t ′, t1 < t ′,N,α,Cα ·
[Bel(A, Int.Th(B,φ, t, t ′′,Cφ)∧
Pot.Int.To(B,α, t, t ′,Cα), t)∧
Bel(A,Do(B,α, t1,Cα ∧N)⇒ ¬φ), t)] ⇒
Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t1,Cn), t), where
Cn = Cφ ∧Cα ∧ Pot.Int.To(B,α, t, t ′,Cα)∧ Int.Th(B,φ, t, t ′′,Cφ).
Axiom 10 (Goal-Protection Information Needs—Type 2).
∀A ∈ TA,B ∈ TA, φ,Cφ,N, t, t ′′ > t,∀G ∈ TB, α, t1 < t ′′·
[Bel(A, Int.Th(B,φ, t, t ′′,Cφ), t)∧
Bel(A,∃C′ · Pot.Int.To(G,α, t, t1,C′), t)∧
Bel(A,∃Θα · Do(G,α, t1,Θα)⇒ ¬φ, t)∧
Bel(A,P, t)] ⇒
Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t1,Cn), t), where
P = ∃β,Θβ, tb < t1 · [Bel(B,N, tb)∧ Do(B,β, tb,Θβ)] ⇒
 ∃R,Θα · CBA(G,α,R, t1,Θα),
Cn = Cφ ∧ Int.Th(B,φ, t, t ′′,Cφ)∧ [∃C′ · Pot.Int.To(G,α, t, t1,C′)].
Fig. 11. The axioms for deriving goal-protection information needs.
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∀A,B ∈ TA, φ,Cφ, t, t ′  t,∀N ∈ Needs(Cφ)·
Bel(A, Int.Tx(B,φ, t, t ′,Cφ), t) ⇒ Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t), where
Cn = Cφ ∧ Int.Tx(B,φ, t, t ′,Cφ).
Fig. 12. The axiom for deriving goal-escape information needs.
a.m. on that day (i.e., Pot.Int.To(Eric,meeting, t,9, last(1h))). His assistant will take the
schedule conflict (here N is conflict(talk_happened,meeting)) as Eric’s information need.
Knowing the conflict, Eric can postpone or cancel the lab meeting.
The second type of goal-protection information needs is related to external threats: lack-
ing such information, an agent may not be able to fulfill its chosen goal because agents in
a different team are acting in a way that would thwart its goal. Knowing the threat infor-
mation, the agent could respond in a timely manner to nullify the plan or intention of the
other team.
Axiom 10 in Fig. 11 says that agent A will assume agent B needs N to deal with an
external threat, if A knows (1) B has a chosen goal φ; (2) an agent G in an opposite team
potentially intends to do action α, the doing of which will make φ impossible; (3) G would
not be able to perform α successfully if B knows N and performs some action β in a timely
manner. The context of the information need consists of agent B’s intention, the embedded
context of B’s intention, and agent G’s potential intention.
It is worth noting that the anticipating agent A need not know which action agent B
will choose to respond to the coming threat. Thus, Axiom 10 leaves open the possibility of
searching for recipes/plans to avoid the threat. On the other hand, the axiom offers B the
flexibility of choosing one from several possible reactions. Axiom 10 will further elicit the
anticipation of action-performing information needs, once it becomes clear to agent A that
agent B will adopt a particular action (Int.To) to deal with the threat.
5.4. Goal-escape information needs
It could be the case that if an agent did not know that the context or escape condition had
changed status, the agent might take actions that would foil the mission of the whole team.
Axiom 11 in Fig. 12 states that if agent A believes that agent B has a goal (Int.Th or Int.To),
A will assume that B needs the information described by N , which is generated from the
context of B’s intention. The context of the information need consists of B’s intention and
the context of B’s intention. Int.Tx in Axiom 11 refers to either Int.Th or Int.To, and φ refers
to either a proposition or an action, respectively.
From this axiom, it can be proved22 that teammates can anticipate each other’s goal-
escape information needs related to their team intentions (e.g., Int.Th(T1, φ, t, t ′,Cφ) is an
intention of team T1).
The Joint Intentions theory includes a provision that agents who become aware of
certain conditions will adopt certain goals. In accord with the Joint Intentions theory,
22 Assume that joint intentions imply individual intentions [23].
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conditions of their goals. Such anticipation may or may not result in communicative ac-
tions, depending on whether the agent can possibly do those helpful behaviors.
5.5. Self-reflection on information needs
Being aware of its own information needs, an agent could, instead of passively waiting
for others’ help, choose to proactively request assistance from teammates or subscribe its
information needs from a known information provider. However, as we mentioned before,
usually an agent may not be able to know its own information needs by reflection for
various reasons. For instance, due to lack of expertise or observability, an agent may have
difficulty inferring all the information needs by itself that are relevant to making a certain
decision or protecting a certain goal.
But under some contexts, an agent can anticipate its own information needs from the
already committed intentions. For instance, when A and B refer to the same agent, Ax-
iom 6.1 states that an agent can derive its own information needs when the agent intends to
do some action but lacks the pre-requisite information. Similarly, when A and B refer to
the same agent, Axiom 11 states that an agent needs to know all the information relevant
to the context of the committed intention.
Knowing its own information needs is not enough; the agent has to know whom to ask.
Hence, teammates’ anticipation described above and proactive assistance to be studied later
play a critical role in cases where the information needer is not aware of its information
needs or does not know whom to ask.
5.6. Discussion
Given the complexity of the problem of anticipating others’ information needs, it would
be cumbersome to have one axiom apply to all the situations. Table 1 summarizes the scope
of reasoning covered by the axioms given in this section, where Axiom 9′ and Axiom 10′
refer to axioms similar to Axiom 9 and Axiom 10, respectively, for the combination of
Pot.Int.Th and Int.Th.
The types of information needs characterized by the axioms are by no means complete;
the vacant fields in Table 1 reveal the potential directions to be explored in the future. On
the other hand, the given axioms are not redundant either. For instance, to anticipate B’s
Table 1
Anticipating information needs from intentions
Intentions Intentional Action Recipe
context preconditions knowledge
Int.To Axiom 11 Axiom 6.1
Int.Th Axiom 11 Lemma 1
Pot.Int.To Axiom 6.2
Pot.Int.Th
Pot.Int.To+ Int.Th Axioms 8, 9, 10
Pot.Int.Th+ Int.Th Axioms 9′, 10′
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adopted intention and potential intentions. The difference is that the adopted intention and
potential intentions in Axiom 8 are highly related (consistent) while the adopted intention
and the potential intention in Axiom 9 are typically competitive. Examples can be given to
show that the ability to anticipate others’ information needs would be weakened if any of
the axioms were removed from the framework.
6. Commitment to other’s information needs
When an agent recognizes the information needs of its teammates by being informed or
by anticipating, it will consider providing help if that would not foil the fulfillment of the
adopted intentions or reduce the performance of the whole team. An important issue here
is how to relate an agent’s belief about the information needs of teammates to intentions
to help. One may be tempted to establish this linkage using an axiom similar to Axiom 1:
If (1) agent A believes that agent B has an information need, (2) A believes that B does
not have the information, and (3) the performance of some action β can lead to B’s aware-
ness of the information, then A will consider doing β . However, this seemingly intuitive
approach has two drawbacks: (1) it requires the action β be explicitly prescribed, and (2) it
does not explicitly specify that agent A should be persistent in its helpful commitment to
the information needs.
One more general approach is to make abstract rather than specific the commitments
for satisfying others’ information needs, postponing the specific commitments (and their
reconciliation) to later stages. In this way, the commitment to providing help can be clearly
separated from the decisions on how to provide help. We conjecture that this would im-
prove flexibility in implementing agent teams with multiple proactive behaviors.
Let BA be the belief base of agent A; then BA |= p represents that p is a logical con-
sequence of BA. For any agent A and need-expression N , function info(A,N) returns the




N if BA |= N , and N is a proposition,
¬N if BA |= ¬N , and N is a proposition,
Refer(N,Q) if N = (iota ?x p( ?x)),
Q ∈ Σ = {θ · ?x : BA |= θ · p, θ is most general
substitution (mgs)}, and Σ is singleton,
Refer(N,Q) if N = (any ?x p( ?x)),
Q ∈ Σ = {θ · ?x : BA |= θ · p, θ is mgs} = ∅,
Refer(N,Σ) if N = (all ?x p( ?x)),
Σ = {θ · ?x : BA |= θ · p, θ is mgs}.
info(A,N) is undefined in the following cases: (1) N is a proposition, but neither BA |=
N nor BA |= ¬N holds. In this case, the information related to N is unknown to agent A.
(2)N = (iota ?x p( ?x)) but Σ is not a singleton. In this case, a unique solution is required
but agent A finds more than one solution for p( ?x). (3)N = (any ?x p( ?x)) but Σ = ∅.
In this case, agent A finds no solution for p( ?x). In cases where N = (any ?x p( ?x)) and
|Σ | > 1, a randomly selected element of Σ is returned.
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Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t) ⇒
[has.info(A,N, t) ⇒ Pot.Int.Th(A,Bel(B, infot (A,N), t ′), t, t ′,Cn)∨
¬has.info(A,N, t) ⇒ Pot.Int.Th(A,has.info(B,N, t ′), t, t ′,Cn)].
Fig. 13. The axiom for proactive assist.
Usually function info is evaluated at a certain time point. We thus use infot (A,N)
to denote the information returned when agent A evaluates N at time t . Predicate
has.info(A,N, t) is true when infot (A,N) is defined, and false otherwise.
Axiom 12 in Fig. 13 says that when an agent comes to know another agent’s information
needs, the first agent will adopt an attitude of potential intention-that toward “the other’s
belief about the needed information”. It is worth noting that even if A is unaware of the
information needed by B , A can still adopt an intention which might lead it to engage other
agents in providing help (e.g., by forwarding the information need to another agent).
In Axiom 12 we use Pot.Int.Th rather than Pot.Int.To because Pot.Int.To requires the agent
to adopt a specific action to help the needer while Pot.Int.Th offers the agent flexibility in
choosing how to help. Note that A and B could refer to the same agent. In this case, from
the semantics of InfoNeed, the truth value of has.info(A,N, t) must be false. Then, the
axiom would allow an agent to adopt a potential intention, which would further stimulates
the agent to consider means-ends reasoning to help itself. Axiom 12 relates information
needs with potential intentions-that. It, together with Axiom 3, specifies how an agent
chooses appropriate actions to satisfy its own or others’ information needs.
Being aware of others’ information needs does not always lead to helping actions. Many
factors (e.g., an agent is simply too busy) may prevent an agent from adopting the commit-
ment. This is the reason why instead of Int.Th we choose Pot.Int.Th, which offers agents the
flexibility of deciding whether to help. Once the Pot.Int.Th is upgraded to Int.Th, the agent
is committed to retrying until either the information needer is satisfied or the information
need is no longer relevant.
Furthermore, if an agent has an intention-that concerning some other agent’s informa-
tion need, then Axiom 3 implies that agent may eventually adopt Pot.Int.To’s to fulfill that
information need. This enables our framework to specify the situations in which an agent
could reflect on its helping behaviors, yet leaves open the agent’s commitment to such be-
haviors. When an agent faces multiple opportunities to assist, it will not be restricted to
committing to a specific helping action.
7. Proactive inform
Up to now, we have discussed how agents anticipate others’ information needs and
how agents choose to help others with their information needs by adopting appropriate
intentions and potential intentions. By Axiom 3, we also know that agents will eventually
perform certain actions to fulfill their commitments to helping others. In this and the next
section, we will introduce two kinds of communicative actions that can be used to fulfill
an agent’s commitments regarding others’ information needs.
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literature (e.g., Inform [21,22]) in at least two ways. First, the new identified communica-
tive actions are need-driven performatives in the sense that the speaker is aware of the
addressee’s information needs prior to performing these actions. Such need-driven seman-
tics has never been explicitly captured before. For instance, in FIPA [1], even though “ask”
intuitively conveys the speaker’s need to the addressee, such a need is not captured in the
semantics of ask (defined in terms of query-if ). Similarly, the addressee’s reply to an “ask”
should be derived from its awareness of the asking agent’s needs, rather than being sim-
ply treated as a reactive act (i.e., modeled as an “inform” regarding the result of a query
to its belief base). Of course, the replying agent knows implicitly that the asking agent
needs to know the thing it asked, but such an implicit reflection on another’s needs is still
weak: the replying agent does not know the purpose or context of the asking agent’s needs.
Generally, as far as communicative acts are concerned, deliberative semantics would be
preferable to reactive semantics for at least two reasons. First, the well-adopted idea of
performative-as-attempt promotes mentalistic characterization of communicative acts; this
can be better leveraged by providing deliberative semantics for communicative acts. Sec-
ond, information needs are more stable, and thus more valuable than information itself.
Explicitly capturing information needs makes it possible for agents to commit persistently
to satisfying these information needs: an agent can proactively deliver information when-
ever the information changes.
Second, the newly identified communicative actions allow the flow of information needs
as well as the exchange of information. This becomes possible in our framework due to the
introduction of the concept of information needs. The flow of information needs offers
three benefits:
(1) It can be used by the addressee agent to account for the communication behaviors
of the speaking agent and by the speaking agent to establish certain expectations of
the possible response from the addressee agent. A speaking agent may also want to
initiate conversations to confirm that the anticipated information needs do reflect the
real needs of the addressee;
(2) It enables agents in a team to better establish and evolve an “approximate mental mod-
el” regarding others’ information needs. Such a mental model is important for further
enhancing a team of agents in their intelligent information exchange; and
(3) The contexts of information needs allow agents to make certain inferences about the
activities being pursued by the information needers. This is useful for recognizing
teammates’ plans (recipes), explaining teammates’ intention-shifting, and for better
anticipating teammates’ information needs.
7.1. ProInform
We will use ProInform (i.e., Proactive Inform) to refer to the new communicative act to
be defined. One may be tempted to define it using compositionality of speech acts like:
[Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,C), t)∧ (I = info(A,N))]; Inform(A,B, , I, . . .).
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[(ta < t ′)∧ (I = info(A,N))]?;Attempt(A, ,P,Q,Cn, t, ta), where
P = Bel(B, I, t ′),
Q= ∃t ′′ · (t  t ′′ < ta)∧ MB({A,B},ψ, t ′′), where
ψ = ∃Cp,∃tb · (t ′′  tb < ta)∧ γ∧ Int.Th(A,Bel(B,φ, tb), t, tb,Cp), where
φ = Bel(A, I, t)∧ Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t),
γ = [Cp ⊇ {Cn,Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t), (c1)
Bel(A, I, t), (I = info(A,N)), (c2)
pos(N)⇒ [Bel(A,UBif(B, I, t), t)∨ CBel(A,B, I, t)]}]. (c3)
Fig. 14. The definition of proactive-inform.
However, this definition does not explicitly convey the receiver’s information need as an
account of the speaker’s communicative act, even though the definition requires the speaker
to believe the communicated information is related to the receiver’s information needs.
As we mentioned above, agents having mutual awareness of their information needs can
improve the effectiveness of proactive communication.
For this reason, we define ProInform in Fig. 1423 by extending the semantics of Inform
with additional requirements on the speaker’s awareness of and willingness to convey the
anticipated information needs of the addressee. Thus, the speaker’s belief about the ad-
dressee’s need for the information is explicitly included as a part of the mental states being
communicated.
The ultimate goal of ProInform is to let B at time t ′ believe the information I related
to the need-expression N . According to the definition of InfoNeed, A knows that B will
need the information related to N by time t ′ (e.g., t ′ may be the last opportunity for B to
perform some action in order to achieve some goal). This means that A, to be helpful, has
to deliver the relevant information no later than t ′; otherwise such a ProInform makes no
sense.24 Normally, B can get the information delivered by A before t ′. In such cases, B
will be lucky to find out at t ′ that the information B needs next is already available. Thus,
to let B believe I at t ′ is actually A’s lowest expectation in using ProInform to help B .
After that, B may continue to believe the information, or drop it if it conflicts with newly
acquired information.
The honest effort of ProInform is to establish a mutual belief about the speaker’s goal
to let the addressee know that (1) the speaker knows the information being communicated,
and (2) the speaker knows the addressee needs the information. The mutual belief is estab-
lished at some time t ′′ before ta ; the uncertainty of t ′′ is due to the uncertainty of the factors
like the delay of communication, the reliability of communication, etc. For the same rea-
son, the Int.Th in the mutual belief to be established also refers to an uncertain time point
tb. Time tb is somewhere between t ′′ and ta because A is intending to change B’s beliefs
after the establishment of the mutual belief rather than before. We could replace tb with
t , and then the content of the mutual belief would be an intention at t . Consequently, B
23 Refer to Section 3.1 for the definitions of CBel and UBif, and refer to Section 4.2 for the definition of pos.
24 Notice that in the definition ta < t ′ . This ensures that ProInform is only performed to satisfy others’ informa-
tion needs in the future.
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time t . The approach used in the definition is more straightforward.
The definition of ProInform involves two contexts: Cn and Cp . Cn refers to the context
of the information need under concern; it is also used as the context of the Attempt. Cp
is the ‘actual’ context of ProInform. The context of a proactive communicative act plays
an important role in specifying the semantics of the act, and in allowing agents involved
in a conversation session to interpret each other’s communication behavior. Before talking
about Cp , we first examine in general what the context of a proactive performative may be
composed of.
First of all, proactive communicative acts are performed only when it is necessary. Their
contexts should capture appropriate “escape” conditions; the attempting agent (the initiator
or the addressee) could discharge its duty of achieving the communicative goal whenever
it realizes that the escape conditions no longer hold. Such excuses are typically related to
the information need under consideration because proactive communicative acts are per
se driven by information needs. This may include the context of the information need and
the speaker’s belief of the information need. Both are necessary because the truth value of
either one cannot be derived from the other. The expiration time of the information need
also implicitly establishes an escape condition for proactive performatives.
Second, like domain actions, communicative acts cannot be performed if the associated
constraints are not satisfied. The constraints of a proactive communicative act may include:
(1) the beneficiary agent does not have the information to be delivered or has the wrong
information; (2) the sending agent either has the information or knows how to acquire
the information (e.g., by requesting from a known provider). Also, an agent may consider
certain personalized constraints such as the threshold on the possibility that the needer
can get the information from other teammates, and the tradeoff between the benefits of
communication and the potential side-effects (e.g., being overheard by opponent agents,
slowing down its individual activities, etc.).
Optionally, the context of a proactive performative may specify the expected commu-
nication delay, the frequency of retry, and the conversation policy, which circumscribes
the potential responses from the receiver as well as the speaker’s reactions to a reply. The
context may also specify common assumptions related to social relationships such as agent
sincerity in communication, agent activeness (extraversion, agreeableness, etc. [33]), agent
cooperativeness.
Table 2 summarizes the compositions of contexts for proactive performatives. Both
constraints and escape conditions are essential parts. The optional part can serve as en-
Table 2
Contexts of proactive performatives: the composition
Escape conditions Constraints (example) Optional (example)
• the expiration time of the • the beneficiary holds no • conversation policy
InfoNeed hasn’t come or wrong beliefs about the • expected delay
• the context of the info to be delivered • sincerity
InfoNeed holds • the speaker holds or knows • activeness
• the speaker believes how to get the information
the InfoNeed
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indirect proactive speech acts. In this paper, the optional part is left open when a performa-
tive context is specified.
Now we come to the performative context of ProInform. Cp includes the context of the
information need (Cn) and A’s belief of the information need, which together serve as
escape conditions in Cp . This means, agent A will abandon the intention Int.Th (embedded
in the mutual belief to be established) whenever A believes the context Cn no longer holds
or A no longer believes B will need I . In addition, since the Int.Th will be established as
a mutual belief, Cn, as a part of Cp , may also be exploited by B to justify the information
need anticipated by A: B may inform A that B never held the intentions from which A
managed to derive the information need. Thus, A can discharge its help by dropping the
incorrect information need. This shows how the context of information needs plays a role
in specifying the semantics of communicative acts driven by information needs.
Lines c2 and c3 in Cp are constraints. It does not make sense for agent A to ProInform
information I to agent B if A currently does not believe I . When the need-expression N
refers to a proposition, agent A ProInforms information I only when A believes B does not
have I or B holds a wrong belief of I .
The above described components of Cp only establish the minimum requirements on
Cp . The complete composition of Cp is implementation-dependent. The performative
context Cp justifies the behavior of an agent who uses ProInform. For instance, suppose
ProInform is implemented in a multi-agent system using a component that reasons about
the information needs of teammates and a communication plan involving sending, receiv-
ing confirmation, and re-sending if confirmation is not received. An agent can choose to
abandon such a communication plan during execution if the agent realizes the context of
the addressee’s information need is no longer true.
7.2. A conversation protocol for ProInform
Intentional semantics of performatives is desirable because humans’ choice of com-
mitments to communicative acts really involves reasoning about the beliefs, intentions,
and abilities of other agents. However, reliable logical reasoning about others’ private be-
liefs and goals is technically difficult. Practical agent systems typically employ various
assumptions to simplify this issue. One promising approach is to frame the semantics of
performatives using publicly shared protocols or conversation policies. Conversation poli-
cies, serving as constraints on the potentially unbounded universe of semantically coherent
message sequences [41], make it easier for the agents involved in a conversation to model
and reason about each other. In particular, conversation policies can restrict agents’ atten-
tion to a smaller set of possible responses which otherwise could be larger.
To design protocols for ProInform, we start with the potential responses of the addressee
to a ProInform. An “acceptance” response is what the initiator of ProInform most wants
to bring about because this is exactly the best reward for its helping behavior. However,
an addressee may disregard or even explicitly reject a ProInform for many reasons. For
instance, an addressee may prefer to keep what it already has if that conflicts with the
information received from the speaker of ProInform. The semantics of ProInform also has
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WAcceptInfo(B,A, , I,N, t, ta, t ′,Cn) Inform(B,A, ,ψ, t, ta), where
ψ = Bel(B, I, t)∧ Bel(B,¬InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t);
SAcceptInfo(B,A, , I,N, t, ta, t ′,Cn) Inform(B,A, ,ψ, t, ta), where
ψ = Bel(B, I, t)∧ Bel(B, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t)∧
Int.Th(B,Bel(B, I, t ′), t, t ′,Cn);
WRejectInfo(B,A, , I,N, t, ta, t ′,Cn) Inform(B,A, ,ψ, t, ta), where
ψ = ¬Bel(B, I, t)∧ Bel(B, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t);
SRejectInfo(B,A, , I,N, t, ta, t ′,Cn) Inform(B,A, ,ψ, t, ta), where
ψ = ¬Bel(B, I, t)∧ Bel(B,¬InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t).
Fig. 15. The responses to proactive-inform.
direct impacts on the receiver. For instance, a ProInform may be rejected simply because
the receiver does not agree on the information need anticipated by the speaker.
As shown in Fig. 15, we define two kinds of acceptance in response to ProInform: WAc-
ceptInfo (accept the information but refuse the information need) and SAcceptInfo (accept
the information and the information need), and define two kinds of refusal in response to
ProInform: WRejectInfo (reject the information but accept the information need) and SRe-
jectInfo (reject the information and the information need).
By WAcceptInfo, an accepting agent B attempts to inform the listening agent A that it
accepts the information I from A but rejects the information need anticipated by A. In this
case, B may think information I will be useful in its other activities.
SAcceptInfo carries stronger semantics: the accepting agent B attempts to let the lis-
tening agent A know that it really adopts the information and will commit to maintaining
the information up to the time the need expires. Note that even though B believes I at the
time of doing SAcceptInfo, I may change between t and t ′. In the case that A or some
other agent observes such a change, the agent may perform another ProInform to B . If this
happens, agent B needs to drop the obsolete Int.Th before performing another SAcceptInfo.
By WRejectInfo, agent B attempts to inform agent A, the speaker of ProInform that B
believes it has the information need anticipated by A, but does not believe I . In such a
case, I may conflict with B’s existing beliefs related to N , and B chooses to persist in
what it believes.
SRejectInfo carries stronger semantics: the rejecting agent B attempts to inform the
listening agent A that it believes neither the information I nor the information need antici-
pated by A. This may enable A to revise its model about B’s information needs, as well as
discharge A from further helping B regarding N .
Fig. 16 shows a conversation protocol involving ProInform using a Petri-Net represen-
tation [38]. One of the criteria in designing this protocol is that it should be able to enrich
team intelligence in proactive information delivery by considering not only the exchange
of information but also the flow of information needs.
The states in Fig. 16 are labeled s0 to s6 and each state transition is labeled by a com-
municative act. The sink states s4, s5, and s6 are possible final states, where s5 is the main
final state representing the ideal execution of the protocol. The context of ProInform can be
recorded in the start state s0 and the goal (i.e., let B know the information related to N )
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can be recorded in the main final state, s5. In the beginning, an initiator A proactively in-
forms agent B a piece of information related to need-expression N . Agent B may respond
with one of five possible choices:
(1) B strongly accepts A’s ProInform by performing SAcceptInfo;
(2) B strongly accepts A’s ProInform simply by keeping silent if timeout is commonly
assumed by both parties as strong acceptance;
(3) B performs WRejectInfo in response to A’s ProInform, and the protocol terminates at
state s4. In this case, the protocol may be extended such that A will persuade B to
update its information, or send B newly acquired information related to N ;
(4) B performs SRejectInfo in response to A’s ProInform;
(5) B performs WAcceptInfo in response to A’s ProInform.
In the first two cases, the protocol terminates and A can discharge its helpful commitment
to B regarding the information related to N . In the last two complicated cases, agent A will
keep trying to help B recognize its information need related to N . For instance, assuming
that B could not recognize N as its information need due to a lack of inference knowledge,
and knowing that K is closer than N to B’s purpose (e.g., performing some action), A
will take K as B’s new information need and perform another ProInform with respect to
information need K . Such a recursive process may terminate when A chooses to accept
B’s refusal, or B clarifies to A that its refusal is not due to a lack of certain inference
knowledge (e.g., the information need N anticipated by A is simply wrong). In these two
cases, the protocol terminates at state s6, where the initiator of ProInform might revise its
belief about B’s information needs.
It is easy to show that the protocol is complete in the sense that no undischarged com-
mitments are left behind.
7.3. Some properties of ProInform
Theorem 1. Successful performance of the ProInform act establishes a mutual belief be-
tween the sender and the addressee that the sender believes the delivered information and
the sender believes that the addressee needs the delivered information. Formally,
|= SuccDone(A,ProInform(A,B, , I,N, t, ta, t ′,Cn)) ⇒
MB({A,B},Bel(A, I, t)∧ Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t), ta).
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(2) By (1), the definition of SuccDone (Definition 7 in Section 3.5) and the definition of
ProInform (cf. Fig. 14), there exists a time t1 < ta such that MB({A,B},ψ, t1), where
ψ = ∃Cp,∃tb · (t1  tb < ta)∧ γ ∧ Int.Th(A,Bel(B,φ, tb), t, tb,Cp),
where
γ = [Cp ⊇ {Cn,Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t),
Bel(A, I, t), (I = info(A,N)),
pos(N) ⇒ [Bel(A,UBif(B, I, t), t)∨ CBel(A,B, I, t)]}],
φ = Bel(A, I, t)∧ Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t)
≡ Bel(A, I ∧ InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t)
≡ Bel(A, δ, t), where
δ = I ∧ InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn).
(3) A is assumed to be sincere, thus by Axiom 2 (cf. Fig. 3) we have
Int.Th(A,Bel(B,Bel(A, δ, t), tb), t, tb,Cp) ⇒
[Bel(A, δ, t)∧ Int.Th(A,Hold(δ, tb), t, tb,Cp)].
(4) From (2) and (3) we have MB({A,B},Bel(A, δ, t), t1).
(5) By Assumption 2 (cf. Section 3.1), we can conclude that
MB({A,B},Bel(A, δ, t), ta). 
Note that in the proof of Theorem 1, it does not matter whether agents A and B can
agree on a context Cp and a specific time point for tb . Moreover, for each A and B , the
value of tb may be different in different possible worlds.
Theorem 2. Successful performance of a ProInform with respect to I and N followed by a
successful SAcceptInfo by the addressee of ProInform establishes a mutual belief between
the two agents that the information I is true and the addressee of ProInform really needs
N . Formally (t0 < t1 < t2 < t3 < t ′),
|= SuccDone(A,ProInform(A,B, 1, I,N, t0, t1, t ′,Cn))∧
SuccDone(B,SAcceptInfo(B,A, 2, I,N, t2, t3, t ′,Cn))
⇒ MB({A,B}, I ∧ InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t3).
Proof. (1) Assume that
SuccDone(A,ProInform(A,B, 1, I,N, t0, t1, t ′,Cn))
and
SuccDone(B,SAcceptInfo(B,A, 2, I,N, t2, t3, t ′,Cn))
hold.
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MB({A,B},Bel(A, I, t0)∧ Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t0), t1).
(3) By Proposition 1 and the definition of SAcceptInfo, we have
MB({B,A},Bel(B, I, t2)∧ Bel(B, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t2), t3).
(4) By Assumption 3 (cf. Section 3.5), A’s commitments in ProInform and B’s com-
mitments in SAcceptInfo prevent them from changing beliefs about I and the information
need before t3. Thus, we can conclude that
MB({A,B}, I ∧ InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t3). 
From Theorem 2 we can draw a conclusion that the protocol shown in Fig. 16 is correct
in the sense that successful execution of ProInform and SAcceptInfo can achieve the goal
of the protocol.
Similarly we can prove the following results.
Theorem 3. (1) Successful performance of a ProInform with respect to I and N followed
by a successful WAcceptInfo by the addressee of ProInform establishes a mutual belief
between the two agents that the information I is true;
(2) Successful performance of a ProInform with respect to I and N followed by a suc-
cessful WRejectInfo by the addressee of ProInform establishes a mutual belief between the
two agents that the addressee of ProInform really needs N ;
(3) Successful performance of a ProInform with respect to I and N followed by a suc-
cessful SRejectInfo by the addressee of ProInform can only establish a mutual belief of the
addressee (of ProInform)’s belief regarding the information I and the need N . Formally
(t0 < t1 < t2 < t3 < t ′),
(1) |= SuccDone(A,ProInform(A,B, 1, I,N, t0, t1, t ′,Cn))∧
SuccDone(B,WAcceptInfo(B,A, 2, I,N, t2, t3, t ′,Cn))
⇒ MB({A,B}, [I ∧ Bel(B,¬InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t2)], t3),
(2) |= SuccDone(A,ProInform(A,B, 1, I,N, t0, t1, t ′,Cn))∧
SuccDone(B,WRejectInfo(B,A, 2, I,N, t2, t3, t ′,Cn))
⇒ MB({A,B}, [¬Bel(B, I, t2)∧ InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn)], t3),
(3) |= SuccDone(A,ProInform(A,B, 1, I,N, t0, t1, t ′,Cn))∧
SuccDone(B,SRejectInfo(B,A, 2, I,N, t2, t3, t ′,Cn))
⇒ MB({A,B}, [¬Bel(B, I, t2)∧ Bel(B,¬InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t2)], t3).
Theorem 4. A ProInform can be performed even when the receiver does not realize it needs
the information. Formally,
SuccDone(A,ProInform(A,B, , I,N, t, ta, t ′,Cn)) ∧
¬Bel(B, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t)
is satisfiable.
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point t and one for t ′′ (t ′′ < ta) when the honest effort of ProInform is established) and by
showing the possibility of the transition from the first structure to the second.
We define a meta-predicate CUPP(A,φ) to represent that agent A can upgrade the
potential intentions regarding φ to intentions. For example, suppose φ = Bel(D, I, t ′),
then CUPP(A,φ) represents that agent A can upgrade potential intentions such as
Pot.Int.Th(A,Bel(D, I, t ′), t, t ′,Cn) to an intention Int.Th(A,Bel(D, I, t ′), t, t ′,Cn). CUPP
is used to abstract away the details about how agents reconcile conflicts.
Theorem 5. If agent A believes information I related to B’s need N , it will consider
helping B with I using ProInform. Formally,
|= [Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t)∧ Bel(A, I, t)∧ (I = info(A,N))∧
¬Bel(A,Bel(B, I, t ′), t)∧ CUPP(A,Bel(B, I, t ′))] ⇒
∃t1, t2,C′ · Pot.Int.To(A,ProInform(A,B, , I,N, t1, t2, t ′,Cn), t, t1,C′).
Proof. (1) Assume
¬Bel(A,Bel(B, I, t ′), t), Bel(A, I, t), (I = info(A,N)),
Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t), and CUPP(A,Bel(B, I, t ′)).
(2) has.info(A,N, t) follows from the assumption (I = info(A,N)).
(3) By Axiom 12 (cf. Fig. 13) and Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t), we have
Pot.Int.Th(A,Bel(B, I, t ′), t, t ′,Cn).
(4) By the assumption that CUPP(A,Bel(B, I, t ′)) holds, the potential intention
Pot.Int.Th(A,Bel(B, I, t ′), t, t ′,Cn) can be upgraded to Int.Th(A,Bel(B, I, t ′), t, t ′,Cn).
(5) Agents are assumed to have the capabilities of doing communicative actions. Also,
from Theorem 2 we know that A’s ProInform followed by B’s SAcceptInfo can make
Bel(B, I, t ′) true. Thus there exist t1 and t2 such that
Lead(A,ProInform(A,B, , I,N, t1, t2, t ′,Cn),Bel(B, I, t ′), t, t1,Θ).25
(6) From the assumption ¬Bel(A,Bel(B, I, t ′), t), (4), (5), and Axiom 3, we can de-
rive Pot.Int.To(A,ProInform(A,B, , I,N, t1, t2, t ′,Cn), t, t1,Θ ∧Cn). This completes the
proof. 
Note that in Theorem 5, the context C′ of A’s potential intention is actually composed
of the context Cn of B’s information need and the constraints of performing ProInform.
8. Proactively subscribe information needs
In Section 5, we examined how an agent may anticipate other teammates’ information
needs based on their shared mental models. While an agent may be able to anticipate
25 Refer to Fig. 5 for the definition of Lead.
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and sometimes the whole team might have to pay the price for a delay in information
sharing. A complementary means is to allow agents to reasonably share their information
needs with their teammates.
Information needs is a kind of meta-level information. After proclaiming its information
needs to another teammate, an agent typically wants to receive either a firm commitment
or refusal from that addressee. For instance, suppose agent A needs weather forecast infor-
mation for a particular area in a battle space for a certain time period, and agent B is one of
the weather information providers known to A. To let B know its information need, A ac-
tually intends that B commit to delivering the relevant information during the time period.
In other words, A is expecting a confirmation from B regarding whether B can satisfy the
information need. Such a confirmation is critical because if refused, agent A could proac-
tively gather the needed information using alternative means (e.g., by requesting another
weather information provider). Without B’s confirmation, agent A will be left with a hard
decision on whether to request help from another teammate because requesting multiple
teammates may result in redundant information delivery.
Hence, the essence of “informing an information need” is not just information sharing,
but more “expecting the addressee to adopt a commitment to satisfying the information
need under concern”. We take this as a criterion to see whether compositionality of speech
acts suffice to capture such semantics.
The first attempt is to treat “informing an information need” as a special case of inform-
ing information. It can thus be defined in terms of Inform as:
Inform(A,B, , InfoNeed(A,N, t ′,Cn), t, ta). (8.1)
Defined as such, agent A merely informs agent B of its information need N . Even though
B does accept such an Inform (i.e., Bel(B, InfoNeed(A,N, t ′,Cn), ta) holds), according to
Axiom 12, B will only consider sending–rather than adopting a commitment to sending—
A the information described by N unless irrelevant.
One might also be tempted to model it using Request, since the speaker is expecting
the addressee to perform a certain communicative action. In doing so, Request and Inform
may be composed as:
Request(A,B, , Inform(B,A, ′, info(B,N), t1, t2), t, ta,Θ). (8.2)
However, defined as such, B is required to send information based on its beliefs at exactly
the time it performs Inform (the evaluation of info(B,N) works like a query to a database
server). Composition (8.2) even does not allow B to know A’s information need. B thus is
under no obligation to send A the relevant information when it becomes available.
One may also want to compose Request together with ProInform as:
Request(A,B, ,ProInform(B,A, ′, I,N, t1, t2, t ′,Cn), t, ta,Θ). (8.3)
Like (8.2), by accepting this Request, agent B only makes a one-time response to A’s
information need rather than a long-term commitment until t ′. Moreover, (8.3) requires
that agent B already know A’s information need N (the context of ProInform). In such
cases, we know from Axiom 12 that agent B , whenever possible, will consider helping A
without being requested. Then, the Request in (8.3) is actually of no use.
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consider the sharing of information needs where three parties are involved. As the size of
a team or the complexity of domain tasks increases, the mental model about information
needs of teammates may vary significantly among members of the team. For instance, as
a team scales up in size, the team is often organized into subteams, each of which may be
further divided into smaller subteams, and so on. In such cases, team knowledge might be
distributed among several subteams. Hence, agents in one subteam might not be able to an-
ticipate the information needs of agents in other subteams because they may not share the
resources for doing so, such as the subteam process, the plans, task assignments, etc. To en-
able information sharing among subteams, some agents in a subteam are often designated
as the points of contact with other subteams. For instance, an agent who simultaneously
participates in the activities of two subteams can be designated as the broker agent of the
two subteams. These broker agents play a key role in informing agents outside the subteam
about the information needs of agents in the subteam. Such an observation motivates us to
introduce a proactive performative involving three parties, by which a broker agent A is
expecting a known information provider D to commit to satisfying a third-party agent B’s
information need. When A and B are the same agent, the semantics is reduced to two-party
subscription of information needs.
8.1. Third-party Subscribe
As shown in Fig. 17, we define 3PTSubscribe in terms of Attempt and ProInform.
3PTSubscribe(A,B, D, ,N, t1, t2, t3,Cn) means that agent A, acting as a broker, sub-
scribes from agent D information need N under the context Cn on behalf of agent B until
time t3.
The ultimate goal of 3PTSubscribe is to let B at time t3 believe what D believes at t3
about the information related to the need-expression N . This goal might be unachievable
because B’s and D’s beliefs are out of the control of A, and because the information related
to N may be changing from time to time.
Definition 12. 3PTSubscribe(A,B,D, ,N, t1, t2, t3,Cn)
(t1 < t2 < t3)?;Attempt(A, ,P,Q,Cn, t1, t2), where
P = Bel(B, infot3(D,N), t3),
Q = ∃t ′′ · (t1  t ′′ < t2)∧ MB({A,D}, ρ, t ′′), where
ρ = ∃Cp,∃tb · (t ′′  tb < t2)∧ γ ∧ Int.Th(A,ψ ∧ φ, t1, tb,Cp), where
γ = [Cp ⊇ {Cn,Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t3,Cn), t1), (c1)
Bel(A,has.info(D,N, t1), t1), ¬has.info(A,N, t1), (c2)
¬Bel(A,Bel(D, InfoNeed(B,N, t3,Cn), t1), t1)}], (c3)
ψ = Bel(D,Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t3,Cn), t1), tb),
φ = Int.Th(D, δ, tb, tb,Cn), where
δ = ∀t ′  t3, I · [BChange(D,N, t ′)∧ (I = infot ′(D,N))] ⇒
∃ta, tc · Int.To(D,ProInform(D,B, ′, I,N, ta, tc, t3,Cn), t ′, ta,Cn),
BChange(D,N, t) infot (D,N) = infot−1(D,N).
Fig. 17. The definition of third-party subscribe.
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that A intends that (1) ψ : D believes that A believed B has an information need N by t3 un-
der the context Cn, and (2) φ: D intends that whenever acquiring new information related
to N (i.e., D’s belief about N has changed, which is represented by BChange(D,N, t)),
D intends to send the information to B by ProInform as long as B still needs it. The mutual
belief is established at some time t ′′ before t2; the uncertainty of t ′′ is due to the uncertain
factors such as delays of communication, the reliability of communication. For the same
reason, the Int.Th in the mutual belief to be established also refers to an uncertain time
point tb. tb is somewhere between t ′′ and t2 because A is intending to change B’s beliefs
after rather than before the establishment of the mutual belief.
Similar to ProInform, the performative context Cp includes the context of the infor-
mation need (Cn) and A’s belief of the information need, which together serve as escape
conditions in Cp . In addition, since A’s intention will be established as a mutual belief,
the context of the information need will be known to the addressee (agent D). This al-
lows agent D to avoid delivering unneeded information when the context Cn no longer
holds. Lines c2 and c3 in Cp are constraints. If has.info(A,N, t1) held, A would have per-
formed ProInform rather than 3PTSubscribe. A cannot perform 3PTSubscribe if no agent
known to A can be the potential information provider regarding N . Also, A will perform
3PTSubscribe only to those potential providers who, in A’s opinion, do not believe in the
information need known to A. For those providers who know B’s information need, A
would assume they will help B as far as possible without A’s 3PTSubscribe.
We now compare 3PTSubscribe with the approaches identified in the beginning of this
section. When applied to three parties, (8.2) can be upgraded to:
Request(A,D, , Inform(D,B, ′, info(B,N), t1, t2), t, ta,Θ). (8.2′)
(8.3) can also be restructured to involve three parties:
Request(A,D, ,α, t1, t2,Θ);ProInform(A,B, ′, I,N, t3, t4, t ′,Cn), (8.3′)
where α is the action that A requests D to do (e.g., Inform), and the performance of α will
result in A’s awareness of information I .
Compared to (8.2′), in (8.3′) agent A can get the information needed by B as a by-
product. However, neither (8.2′) nor (8.3′) is equivalent to 3PTSubscribe in semantics
because neither of them allows the sharing of information needs. Nevertheless, (8.2′) and
(8.3′) are useful in certain cases. For instance, if the information needed is static, (8.2′)
is better than 3PTSubscribe, because the former relieves the information-providing agent
from monitoring I for detecting changes.
Definition 12 characterizes the semantics of third-party subscribing information needs.
In particular, when the broker agent A and the information needer B refer to the same
agent, i.e., 3PTSubscribe(A,A,D, ,N, t1, t2, t3,Cn), it means agent A issues a subscrip-
tion request on its behalf to an information service provider D regarding N .
8.2. Conversation protocol of 3PTSubscribe
To design protocols for 3PTSubscribe, we start with the potential responses of the ad-
dressee to a 3PTSubscribe. As shown in Fig. 18, we define two kinds of acceptance and
two kinds of refusal in response to 3PTSubscribe.
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WAcceptSub(D,B,A, ,N, t1, t2, t3,Cn) Inform(D,A, ,ψ, t1, t2), where
ψ = Bel(D, InfoNeed(B,N, t3,Cn), t1);
SAcceptSub(D,B,A, ,N, t1, t2, t3,Cn) Inform(D,A, ,ψ, t1, t2), where
ψ = Bel(D, InfoNeed(B,N, t3,Cn), t1)∧ Int.Th(D, δ, t1, t1,Cn), where
δ = ∀t ′  t3, I · [BChange(D,N, t ′)∧ (I = infot ′(D,N))] ⇒
∃ta, tc · Int.To(D,ProInform(D,B, ′, I,N, ta, tc, t3,Cn), t ′, ta,Cn);
SRejectSub(D,B,A, ,N, t1, t2, t3,Cn) Inform(D,A, ,ψ, t1, t2), where
ψ = Bel(D,¬InfoNeed(B,N, t3,Cn), t1);
WRejectSub(D,B,A, ,N, t1, t2, t3,Cn,C′) Inform(D,A, ,ψ, t1, t2), where
ψ = ¬Bel(D, InfoNeed(B,N, t3,Cn), t1)∧ Bel(D, InfoNeed(B,N, t3,C′), t1).
Fig. 18. The responses to third-party subscribes.
In the definition of WAcceptSub, an agent D tells the originator of 3PTSubscribe that
D only accepts the information need but refuses to make a commitment to serving the
information need. In the definition of SAcceptSub, an agent D tells the originator of 3PT-
Subscribe that D not only accepts the information need but also adopts a commitment to
the information need.
WAcceptSub may be used when agent D is prevented from making the strong commit-
ment due to more urgent things. Most likely, D cannot make a commitment to helping B
because D is not an information provider of N as A imagined. In such a case, D’s reply
can be taken as an indirect speech act, from which A may infer that D cannot provide the
information relevant to N . However, there may exist other reasons. For instance, D may be
simply too busy. Thus, the acceptance of the information need offers agent D the opportu-
nity of helping agent B later, and with the flexibility of deciding when and how to provide
help. For instance, D could help B by using ProInform or even issuing a 3PTSubscribe to
yet another information provider.
SAcceptSub carries a stronger semantics: the accepting agent D attempts to let the
listening agent A know that D accepted B’s information need known from A, and D
adopted an intention (Int.Th) at t1 to help B whenever necessary. Such an instant intention
corresponds to the intention that A intended D to adopt within the mutual belief that A
attempted to establish in performing 3PTSubscribe.
The addressee may reject a 3PTSubscribe if it simply does not believe in the information
need anticipated by the originator of 3PTSubscribe (in this case, it is meaningless for
the addressee of 3PTSubscribe to make a commitment to provide help); or the addressee
disagrees with the originator of 3PTSubscribe on the context of the information need. We
call the former refusal SRejectSub and the later WRejectSub.
Upon receiving a SRejectSub, the agent A may revise its model of B’s information
needs, or still hold the information need and issue another 3PTSubscribe toward another
information provider.
The receiver of a WRejectSub can refine its model of B’s information need (i.e., change
the context). By reflection, A may be able to improve its capability of anticipating B’s
information needs in the future. After receiving a WRejectSub, A may perform another
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3PTSubscribe to D or another known provider with the context of the information need
changed to C′.
Fig. 19 describes a conversation protocol involving 3PTSubscribe. The states are la-
beled s0 to s4, where s2, s3, and s4 are possible final states and s2 is the main final state
of the protocol. Initially, an initiator agent A performs 3PTSubscribe toward potential in-
formation provider D with respect to need-expression N and the context Cn (the protocol
may not be triggered at all if A keeps silent). Agent D may respond with one of four
possible choices:
(1) D strongly accepts A’s 3PTSubscribe by performing SAcceptSub. In this case, the
protocol terminates and A can discharge its helpful commitment to B;
(2) D performs a WAcceptSub in response to A’s 3PTSubscribe, and the protocol termi-
nates at state s4. In this case, the protocol may be extended such that A will persuade
D to make a commitment to B’s information need;
(3) D performs SRejectSub. In this case, agent A may perform another 3PTSubscribe
with the potential information provider D replaced by some other agent E;
(4) D performs WRejectSub. In this case, agent A may perform another 3PTSubscribe
with the information need context Cn replaced by C′ and probably D replaced by
some other information provider E.
The recursive process involved in the last two cases can terminate when A chooses to
keep silent at state s0 (timeout). Then, at state s3, agent A will retract its belief of B’s
information need regarding N .
8.3. Some properties of 3PTSubscribe
Theorem 6. Successful performance of the 3PTSubscribe act establishes a mutual belief
between the sender and the addressee that the sender believes the delivered information
need. Formally,
|= SuccDone(A,3PTSubscribe(A,B,D, ,N, t1, t2, t3,Cn)) ⇒
MB({A,D},Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t3,Cn), t1), t2).
Proof. (1) Assume SuccDone(A,3PTSubscribe(A,B,D, ,N, t1, t2, t3,Cn)).
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3PTSubscribe (cf. Fig. 17), and the possible world semantics of Int.Th and MB, there exists
a time t ′′ < t2 such that MB({A,D}, ρ, t ′′), where
ρ = ∃Cp,∃tb · (t ′′  tb < t2)∧ γ ∧ Int.Th(A,ψ, t1, tb,Cp),
where
ψ = Bel(D,Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t3,Cn), t1), tb),
γ = [Cp ⊇ {Cn,Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t3,Cn), t1),
Bel(A,has.info(D,N, t1), t1),¬has.info(A,N, t1),
¬Bel(A,Bel(D, InfoNeed(B,N, t3,Cn), t1), t1)}].
(3) A is assumed to be sincere, thus by Axiom 2 in Fig. 3 we have
Int.Th(A,Bel(D,Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t3,Cn), t1), tb), t1, tb,Cp) ⇒
[Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t3,Cn), t1)
∧Int.Th(A,Hold(InfoNeed(B,N, t3,Cn), tb), t1, tb,Cp)].
(4) From (2) and (3) we have MB({A,D},Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t3,Cn), t1), t ′′).
(5) By Assumption 2 (cf. Section 3.1), we can conclude that
MB({A,D},Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t3,Cn), t1), t2). 
Theorem 7. Successful performance of a 3PTSubscribe with respect to B and N followed
by a successful SAcceptSub by the addressee of 3PTSubscribe establishes a mutual belief
between the two agents that the addressee of 3PTSubscribe comes to believe B will need
N and adopts a commitment to helping B . Formally (t0 < t1 < t2 < t3 < t ′),
|= SuccDone(A,3PTSubscribe(A,B,D, 1,N, t0, t1, t ′,Cn))∧
SuccDone(D,SAcceptSub(D,B,A, 2,N, t2, t3, t ′,Cn))
⇒ MB({A,D}, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn)∧ δ, t3), where
δ = ∀t  t ′, I · [BChange(D,N, t)∧ (I = infot (D,N))] ⇒
∃ta, tc · Int.To(D,ProInform(D,B, ′, I,N, ta, tc, t ′,Cn), t, ta,Cn).
Proof. (1) Assume that
SuccDone(A,3PTSubscribe(A,B,D, 1,N, t0, t1, t ′,Cn))
and
SuccDone(D,SAcceptSub(D,B,A, 2,N, t2, t3, t ′,Cn))
hold.
(2) By applying Theorem 6, we have
MB({A,D},Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t0), t1).
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MB({D,A},Bel(D, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t2), t3).
(4) By Assumption 3 (cf. Section 3.5), A’s commitments in 3PTSubscribe and D’s
commitments in SAcceptSub prevent them from changing beliefs about B’s need before
t3. Thus, by the positive introspection of Bel, we can conclude that
MB({A,D}, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t3).
(5) By Proposition 1 and the definition of SAcceptSub, we have
MB({D,A}, Int.Th(D, δ, t2, t2,Cn), t3),
where
δ = ∀t  t ′, I · [BChange(D,N, t)∧ (I = infot (D,N))] ⇒
∃ta, tc · Int.To(D,ProInform(D,B, ′, I,N, ta, tc, t ′,Cn), t, ta,Cn).
The theorem is thus proved from (4) and (5). 
From Theorem 7, we can conclude that the protocol shown in Fig. 19 is correct in the
sense that successful execution of 3PTSubscribe and SAcceptSub can achieve the goal of
the protocol.
Similarly, we can prove the following results.
Theorem 8. (1) A successful performance of 3PTSubscribe with respect to agent B
and N followed by a successful performance of WAcceptSub by the addressee of the
3PTSubscribe establishes a mutual belief between the two agents about B’s information
need regarding N ;
(2) A successful performance of 3PTSubscribe with respect to agent B and N followed
by a successful WRejectSub by the addressee of the 3PTSubscribe establishes a mutual
belief between the two agents that the addressee of the 3PTSubscribe believes that N will
be needed by B under a different context;
(3) A successful performance of 3PTSubscribe with respect to agent B and N followed
by a successful SRejectSub by the addressee of the 3PTSubscribe establishes a mutual
belief between the two agents that the addressee of the 3PTSubscribe believes that B will
not need N .
Formally (t0 < t1 < t2 < t3 < t ′),
(1) |= SuccDone(A,3PTSubscribe(A,B,D, 1,N, t0, t1, t ′,Cn)) ∧
SuccDone(D,WAcceptSub(D,B,A, 2,N, t2, t3, t ′,Cn))
⇒ MB({A,D}, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t3),
(2) |= SuccDone(A,3PTSubscribe(A,B,D, 1,N, t0, t1, t ′,Cn)) ∧
SuccDone(D,WRejectSub(D,B,A, 2,N, t2, t3, t ′,Cn,C′))
⇒ MB({A,D},¬Bel(D, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t2), t3) ∧
MB({A,D},Bel(D, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,C′), t2), t3),
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SuccDone(D,SRejectSub(D,B,A, 2,N, t2, t3, t ′,Cn))
⇒ MB({A,D},Bel(D,¬InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t2), t3).
Theorem 9. A 3PTSubscribe with respect to some information need N can be performed
toward an agent even when the agent actually does not believe any information relevant
to N . Formally,
SuccDone(A,3PTSubscribe(A,B,D, ,N, t1, t2, t3,Cn)) ∧
¬Bel(D,has.info(D,N, t1), t1)
is satisfiable.
Proof. We construct a possible-world structure K1 at t1 that satisfies the context of 3PT-
Subscribe and ¬Bel(D,has.info(D,N, t1), t1). Let the real world w0 be the world when
the 3PTSubscribe is being performed. Let w1 and w2 be the worlds that are both belief and
intention accessible by A, and let w2 and w3 be the worlds that are belief accessible by
D. Let InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn) be true at w1, w2 and w3, and let info(D,N) be defined at
w1 and w2, but not at w3. Similarly, we can construct a structure K2 at t ′′ (t ′′ < t2) when
the honest effort of 3PTSubscribe is established. The transition from K1 to K2 is straight-
forward since communication is reliable. Then, 3PTSubscribe(A,B,D, ,N, t1, t2, t3,Cn)
and ¬Bel(D,has.info(D,N, t1), t1) can both be satisfied by this model. 
Theorem 10. Suppose 3PTSubscribe is the only means considered by all teammates in
reacting to others’ information needs. There may exist a loop that prevents teammates
from helping an information needer.
Proof. We construct a loop using only 3PTSubscribe and WAcceptSub. Suppose that agent
B will need the information described by N before t ′ and agent A is aware of this infor-
mation need, that is, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn) and Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t) hold.
Suppose that A managed to reconcile its potential intentions and eventually performed a
3PTSubscribe at tA to agent D, whom A believed is a potential provider of N . From The-
orem 9, we know that agent D may not be able to directly satisfy B’s needs. Thus, it is
possible for D to perform a WAcceptSub to A—discharging A from retrying to help B—
and then perform a 3PTSubscribe at tD to agent E, who is a potential provider of N from
D’s perspective. Such a process may be repeated until some agent, say M , who was re-
quested to help B using 3PTSubscribe, also performed a 3PTSubscribe to agent A. Then,
agents A,D,E, . . . ,M,A form a loop, and all of them were discharged from helping B
by the WAcceptSub performed by the successive teammate in the loop. 
However, the loops as described in Theorem 10 can be easily avoided if the information
about the first initiator of 3PTSubscribe is maintained as a part of the performative context
and, before initiating another 3PTSubscribe, each agent checks to avoid circularities.
Theorem 11 states that an agent could assist its teammates by adopting a potential
intention-to regarding 3PTSubscribe.
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agent D had the information, it will consider helping B using 3PTSubscribe. Formally,
|= [Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t)∧ ¬has.info(A,N, t)∧
Bel(A,has.info(D,N, t), t)∧ ¬Bel(A,has.info(B,N, t ′), t)∧
CUPP(A,has.info(B,N, t ′))] ⇒
∃t1, t2,C′ · Pot.Int.To(A,3PTSubscribe(A,B,D, ,N, t1, t2, t ′,Cn), t, t1,C′).
Proof. (1) Assume
¬Bel(A,has.info(B,N, t ′), t),¬has.info(A,N, t),
Bel(A,has.info(D,N, t), t),Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t),
and
CUPP(A,has.info(B,N, t ′)).
(2) Since ¬has.info(A,N, t) and Bel(A, InfoNeed(B,N, t ′,Cn), t), by Axiom 12 in
Fig. 13 we have that
Pot.Int.Th(A,has.info(B,N, t ′), t, t ′,Cn)
holds.
(3) From CUPP(A,has.info(B,N, t ′)), the potential intention
Pot.Int.Th(A,has.info(B,N, t ′), t, t ′,Cn)
can be upgraded to Int.Th(A,has.info(B,N, t ′), t, t ′,Cn).
(4) Since Bel(A,has.info(D,N, t), t) holds, from Theorem 7 we know that A’s 3PT-
Subscribe followed by D’s SAcceptSub may lead to B’s belief of the information described
by N because D will send B the relevant information whenever necessary. Thus there exist
t1 and t2 such that
Lead(A,3PTSubscribe(A,B,D, ,N, t1, t2, t ′,Cn),has.info(B,N, t ′), t, t1,Θ).
(5) By Axiom 3 in Fig. 5, (1), (3), and (4) we have
Pot.Int.To(A,3PTSubscribe(A,B,D, ,N, t1, t2, t ′,Cn), t, t1,Θ ∧Cn).
Here, the context of A’s potential intention is composed of the context Cn of B’s informa-
tion need and the constraints of performing 3PTSubscribe. This completes the proof. 
9. Discussion
9.1. The role of observability in reasoning about others’ beliefs
An agent needs to hold certain beliefs about the addressees when performing ProIn-
form and 3PTSubscribe. For instance, ProInform is performed under the context that the
speaker A has beliefs CBel(A,B, I, t) and Bel(A,UBif(B, I, t), t), while 3PTSubscribe
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However, belief reasoning itself is extremely difficult in general [8,9,13,95], and imple-
mented agent systems typically employ various ad hoc assumptions to simplify this issue.
In particular, an agent A can approximately reason about another agent B’s beliefs by
leveraging its knowledge of B’s observability.
Let CObs(B, I,CI ) represent that agent B can observe the truth value of proposition I
if the constraint CI holds. Suppose agent A believes CObs(B, I,CI ) (this can be achieved
by allowing agents to share their observability). Then A could approximately model B’s
belief regarding I using certain assumptions of which the following is one:
Assumption 4. Bel(A,CObs(B, I,CI ), t)∧ Bel(A,CI , t) ⇒ Bel(A,Bif(B, I, t), t).
It says that if agent A believes agent B can observe information I and the corresponding
constraint is satisfiable, A could assume that B is aware of I . This assumption reduces the
likelihood that agent A provides unnecessary help to B . For instance, the derived belief
prevents A from using ProInform to help B .
The following assumption indicates a second use of observability for belief reasoning:
inferring teammates’ lack of beliefs from their lack of observabilities. Let Obs(B) denote
the set of propositions that agent B can potentially observe, i.e.,
Obs(B) = {I |∃CI · CObs(B, I,CI )}.
Assumption 5. (1) Bel(A, I /∈ Obs(B), t) ⇒ Bel(A,UBif(B, I, t), t).
(2) Bel(A,CObs(B, I,CI ), t)∧ Bel(A,¬CI , t) ⇒
CBel(A,B, I, t)∨ Bel(A,UBif(B, I, t), t).
Assumption 5.1 says that agent A could assume that agent B is unaware of information
I if A knows that I is beyond B’s observability; Assumption 5.2 says that even if I is
indeed among those that B can observe, in cases where the constraint for B to observe I
does not hold from A’s perspective, A still assumes that B is unaware of I , or B’s belief
about I conflicts with A’s belief.
However, an agent may establish incorrect models of other agents’ mental states by
inferring their lack of beliefs only based on their lack of observability. For instance, in
Assumption 5.1, agent B might have acquired I from some other agents even though it
lacks the observability regarding I . In Assumption 5.2, it is possible that A and B’s beliefs
about I coincide, or it may even be the case that it is A’s belief about I is incorrect, not
B’s. To bring the assumptions closer to the reality, additional constraints could be added
as the premise, such as “A is the only agent in the team that can observe I ,” and “A knows
that other teammates are all too busy to help B”.
But on the other hand, by assuming B’s unawareness of I or the existence of belief-
conflict regarding I , agent A could choose appropriate communicative actions (e.g., ProIn-
form, 3PTSubscribe) to help B . It is true that more than one agent may be able to anticipate
B’s information need, which might result in redundant help. However, from the whole
team’s viewpoint, redundant helps in information delivery are sometimes useful, with each
serving as a backup to the rest.
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Our proposed framework for specifying proactive information delivery behaviors in
agent teamwork has several implications.
First, it allows an agent to deliver needed information to teammates who could not
have requested the information themselves due to their limited sensing capabilities or their
incomplete knowledge about the distributed environment. Thus, it formally specifies the
proactive information delivery behavior embodied in effective human teams. Software
agents empowered with such capabilities can be used to better simulate, train, or sup-
port the information fusion, interpretation, and decision-makings of agent teams that may
include human agents in the loop.
Second, even though broadcast can be used to deliver information, it would result in an
overwhelming amount of information for agents to process. In this new information age,
the information that a team needs to filter, fuse, and interpret under time pressure increases
at a rapid speed as the domain complexity increases. For instance, the US Army estimates
that, without filter and fusion at lower echelon levels, more than 600,000 reports will need
to be processed every hour by a team of brigade battle staff under the vision of the digi-
tized Objective Force. Similarly, a team of anti-terrorism analysts needs to filter, analyze,
and fuse overwhelming amounts of information from a wide variety of information sources
(e.g., satellite images, intelligence reports and radio transmissions). Each member of these
teams needs to make decisions under time pressures. Delivering only the information rel-
evant to the needs of teammates promises to enable teammates to make better decisions
without overloading them.
Third, agents committed to others’ information needs will continuously monitor the
environment to detect changes relevant to the information needs. In addition, agents can au-
tomatically terminate their “monitoring” activity for a teammate’s information need when
the need becomes irrelevant (e.g., the context of the need is no longer valid). This is very
important in improving the flexibility and rationality of agents implemented for collabora-
tive information-pushing.
Fourth, our proposed framework supports not only the exchanges of information but also
the flows of information needs. This will enable agents in a team to establish and evolve a
“shared mental model” regarding others’ information needs. Such a shared mental model
is valuable for further enhancing a team of agents in their intelligent information exchange.
Fifth, the ways of anticipating others’ information needs proposed in this paper lay the
foundations for developing algorithms for agents to dynamically reason about information
needs of their teammates [100]. For instance, RPD (Recognition-primed decision-making),
proposed by Klein [54], is a well-known naturalistic decision making model and has been
widely adopted in implementing decision-support systems. When RPD is used in a team-
work setting [36], algorithms for anticipating the decision-making information needs can
be developed by following Axiom 8.
Finally, intelligent proactive information delivery is a critical issue in large agent in-
frastructures like Grid [51], where joint activities may involve trans-architecture teams
of agents such as STEAM [91], CAST [99] and D’Agents [40]. It is highly desirable to
provide well-defined semantics for proactive communicative actions used in these agent
infrastructures, as well as mechanisms for accessing shared ontologies. Other proactive
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architectures. Their semantics can be given in the same way as for ProInform and 3PTSub-
scribe.
10. Comparisons
We compare our work with the related literature from four aspects.
10.1. Information needs
Proactive information delivery behavior has long been recognized by researchers study-
ing indirect speech acts in the field of human discourse understanding [3,4,64]. Psycholog-
ical studies about human teams have also identified proactive information delivery as one
of the key behaviors of effective teamwork [32,68,86]. For instance, in a study by Dickin-
son and McIntyre [32], “recognize other members’ need for certain information” is listed
as part of the ATOM teamwork dimensions. The identification of users’ information needs
and the shifting of their information needs are considered as critical issues in developing
user-oriented information systems such as decision support systems [2]. However, the con-
cept of information needs has never been formally characterized before in agent teamwork
settings. This paper not only studied the properties of information needs and categorized
the information needs in agent teamwork, it also connects the anticipated information needs
to potential commitments so that agents could choose appropriate communicative actions
to satisfy teammates’ information needs.
10.2. The SharedPlans theory
Even though the SharedPlans theory was originally motivated by certain problems
within human discourse understanding, the concept of shared plans actually provides a
foundation for theories of collaborative agent behaviors and has been successfully ap-
plied to study general teamwork problems [66,77,91,99]. On the one hand, we adopted
the SharedPlans theory as one of the cornerstones of our framework because it provides
a clean model of shared team processes, which is critical in enabling agents to anticipate
teammates’ information needs. On the other hand, the work in this paper can be taken as
an extension of the SharedPlans formalism. By exploring the potential communication-
related axioms, this paper moves a step toward the goal established by Grosz and Kraus
[42]: to develop a more complete set of communication axioms in SharedPlans theory for
establishing requisite mutual beliefs and for ensuring the satisfaction of intentions-that.
Of course, it is unlikely that a single set of axioms will cover all eventualities because
communication is inherently context-dependent [72]. Our goals are to establish a frame-
work for proactive information delivery behavior and, in the future, to fully examine how
need-driven communications may affect the performance of teams with both human and
software agents.
Our work is related to Lochbaum’s work on knowledge precondition subdialogues,
where it was shown that SharedPlans provide a more detailed account of an agent’s moti-
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(information needer’s) reflection on its lack of knowledge about an action to be performed
initiates an information-seeking dialogue; knowing such a desire, the hearer tries to help
the speaker to acquire the necessary knowledge. While Lochbaum’s approach of using the
SharedPlans theory can be extended to cover information exchange regarding physical pre-
conditions and constraints, it relies too much on discourse understanding, in that it requires
that the information provider be able to infer the speaker’s needs from the preceding utter-
ances. The more interesting behavior, which this paper is trying to cover, is that an agent
could anticipate another’s needs and push the relevant information selectively without be-
ing asked directly or indirectly.
10.3. Semantics of performatives
Research on speech acts can be traced to Austin’s work [5], which was later extended
by Searle [79]. In early 1990s, Cohen and Levesque proposed the idea of “performative-
as-attempt” [22] and modeled speech acts as actions of rational agents in the framework
of intentions [20]. Henceforward, this has been adopted as the standard way of assigning
mentalistic semantics to communicative acts. For instance, Arcol [11], KQML [58], and
FIPA’s ACL [1] are the representatives of agent communication languages proposed so
far. The strictly declarative semantics of performatives in these languages are all framed
in terms of mental attitudes. For example, Arcol uses performance conditions to specify
the semantics of communicative acts. KQML adopts a more operational approach by using
preconditions, postconditions and completion conditions. FIPA ACL is heavily influenced
by Arcol, wherein the semantics of performatives are specified by feasibility preconditions
and rational effect, both of which are formulas of a semantic language SL.
The semantics of communicative acts defined in this paper also draw heavily on Co-
hen and Levesque’s seminal work. However, our work is distinguished from the others by
emphasizing need-driven communications. That is, prior to delivering information to other
agents, an agent has to know explicitly (at least from its own perspective) that the infor-
mation to be sent is what the receiving agent will need in its pursuit of certain team or
individual goals. Need-driven communication is partially supported in Arcol. For instance,
in Arcol, if agent A is informed that agent B needs some information, A would supply
that information as if A had been requested by B . Here, the inform is actually treated as
an indirect request. However, the need-driven communication in Arcol works in a reac-
tive rather than proactive way. In contrast, in our framework, both are allowed due to the
support for reasoning about teammates’ information needs. More specifically, the seman-
tics of ProInform and 3PTSubscribe rely on the performer’s awareness of the beneficiary
agents’ information needs. In addition, our approach allows agents to make long-term com-
mitments regarding others’ information needs. In other words, being aware of agent B’s
information need, agent A will try to update B about the relevant information whenever A
observes a change.
ProInform (proactive inform) is comparable to the performative tell in KQML although
they are not equivalent per se. Both tell and ProInform require an agent to only offer so-
licited information to others. The modal operator WANT in KQML, which stands for the
psychological state of desire, plays the same role as InfoNeed. However, the semantics of
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information needs under certain contexts.
Both 3PTSubscribe and the performative broker_one in KQML [58] involve three par-
ties (but have different semantics). 3PTSubscribe is initiated by a broker agent, who needs
to know the other two parties. An agent cannot perform 3PTSubscribe if it does not know
any potential information provider regarding the information need under concern. This
is desirable to encourage intelligent and efficient communications. Comparatively, the
speaker of broker_one only needs to know the broker agent. This is more flexible be-
cause the broker agent can decide the addressee of the embedded speech act later. While
broker_one can be simulated using Inform and Request, 3PTSubscribe cannot be easily
simulated in KQML.
The performative Proxy in FIPA [1] is defined in terms of Inform (i.e., the sending agent
informs the recipient that the sender wants the receiver to select target agents denoted
by a given description and to perform the embedded communicative act to them). While
Proxy captures a rather weaker third-party semantics, Huber et al. [46] defined a stronger
third-party semantics for PROXY and PROXY-WEAK. Both PROXY and PROXY-WEAK
are based on Request. PROXY imposes significant commitments on the intermediate agent
while PROXY-WEAK reduces the burden placed upon the intermediate agent. “PROXY of
an Inform” and “PROXY-WEAK of an Inform” are different from 3PTSubscribe. PROXY
of an Inform requires the middle agent to believe the information that the speaker wants
him/her to forward to the target agent. Even though PROXY-WEAK of an Inform relaxes
this requirement, both still require that the speaker already hold the information to be deliv-
ered. 3PTSubscribe, focusing on information needs, applies to situations where the speaker
does not have the information needed by others.
More recently, social agency is emphasized as a complement to mental agency due to
the fact that communication is inherently public [82]. This requires the social construction
of communication be treated as a first-class notion rather than as a derivative of the men-
talist concepts. For instance, in a study by Singh [83], speech acts are defined in terms of
social commitments, which are obligations relativized to both the beneficiary agent and the
whole team as the social context. Kumar [55] argued that joint commitments may simulate
social ones because PWAG entails a social commitment provided that the persistent goal
is made public. The semantics of ProInform and 3PTSubscribe adopt a richer notion of
context, which includes the context of the information need under concern. Thus, an agent
could stop providing information once the context is no longer valid. The context can also
be enriched to specify protocols in force, as suggested by Smith et al. [84], and even so-
cial constraints. This enables agents to take the public perspective (e.g., team goals) into
consideration while intending to perform a communicative act.
Compositionality is useful in defining meta-level performatives in terms of elementary
ones. For instance, it is shown that ASK (regarding Yes–No questions) could be defined
in terms of Request and Inform [24]. However, as we have shown, the semantics of ProIn-
form and 3PTSubscribe cannot be simply defined using compositionality. The semantics of
communicative acts has also been studied from a team’s point of view [25,56]. However,
to thoroughly investigate the semantics of proactive communicative acts used in teamwork
settings requires an agent to be able to reason about teammates’ information needs. Our
work in this paper is the first effort toward this end.
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Communicative acts are not simply individual actions; they should be understood as
part of an ongoing social interaction [82]. To fully understand the ties between the seman-
tics of communicative acts and patterns of these acts, conversation policies or protocols
have been studied heavily in the ACL field [18,55,57,72,84,96]. However, conversation
protocols involving proactive performatives have been neglected. Although the protocols
proposed in this paper are rather simple, they not only help in investigating the charac-
teristics of proactive communications enabled by proactive communicative acts, but they
also offer a guide to exploring more complex protocols that support proactive information
delivery behaviors.
Conversation protocols are traditionally specified using finite state machines [83,84].
Enhanced Dooley graphs [71], Colored Petri Nets [26], and a Landmark-based representa-
tion [55] have also been proposed to specify a richer semantics for protocols. For instance,
in a Landmark-based representation, a protocol (family) is specified as a sequence of way-
points (landmarks) that must be followed in order to accomplish the goal associated with
that protocol. Concrete protocols are realized by specifying action expressions for each
landmark transition such that performing the action expressions can result in the landmark
transitions [55]. In this paper we only considered concrete protocols, which are viewed as
patterns of communicative acts, and their semantics tie to those of the involved individual
acts. Petri-nets, as a modeling tool of parallel behaviors, is used to specify the protocols be-
cause the petri-net representations can be easily translated into shared plans through which
the teammates can coordinate their communicative behaviors.
11. Summary
In this paper, we presented a formal framework for the proactive information delivery
behaviors in agent teamwork. The main contribution of this paper is three-fold.
First, we studied the key concept of the framework–information need. In particular,
we used reference expressions to represent information and information need expressions;
clarified the concept of information need by introducing a modal operator InfoNeed, exam-
ining the properties of InfoNeed, and exploring its relationships with other mental modal
operators; analyzed levels of information needs based on the idea of social inference trees;
formally identified four types of information needs prevalent in agent teamwork; and pro-
posed and justified the axioms for anticipating others’ information needs based on shared
team processes. Such formal treatment enables agent systems to explicitly represent and
reason about information needs. Furthermore, it may allow a team of agents to establish
shared mental models regarding their information needs.
Second, we established a formal foundation for proactive information delivery behav-
iors. The framework mainly consists of 8 axioms. Axiom 3 characterizes chains of helping
behaviors in large agent teams. Axiom 5 allows an agent who intends others to be in-
volved in a team activity to release them from the obligations whenever the intentional
context no longer holds. Axioms 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11 state how to anticipate teammates’
action-performing information needs, decision-making information needs, goal-protection
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to potential intentions-that. Together with axiom 3, it allows an agent to choose appropriate
actions to satisfy its own or others’ information needs. In general, the framework formally
specifies two important teamwork behaviors: to anticipate teammates’ information needs
and to proactively help teammates with their information needs. The framework not only
provides a better understanding of the underlying assumptions required to justify the proac-
tive behavior, but also provides a coherent basis for the specification and design of agent
teams with proactive information delivery capabilities.
Third, while several research groups (e.g., CAST [99]) have been employing the Cohen–
Levesque semantics in systems implemented upon the SharedPlans theory, there has been
lacking a formal grounding of that semantics in the SharedPlans theory. This paper filled
this gap by re-formulating the Cohen–Levesque semantics of communicative acts using the
SharedPlans formalism. Based on this, we formally provided semantics for two proactive
communicative acts (i.e., ProInform and 3PTSubscribe) and analyzed proactive communi-
cation in multi-agent systems using the developed formalism. In particular, the semantics
focuses on the deliberation about others’ information needs and allows the information
needs to be transferred as meta-level information. We also examined the properties of the
two proactive performatives and designed a conversation protocol for each. The protocols
based on the semantics of proactive performatives are useful in analyzing and understand-
ing the proactive information flows at different abstract levels in teamwork settings. Agents
using the protocols are able to establish a shared mental model regarding teammates’ infor-
mation needs; the shared mental model could further enhance team performance in terms
of intelligent information exchange.
There are several important issues that deserve further studies. For instance, indirect
speech acts occur prevalently in human discourse. Similarly, indirect information needs
is also a worthwhile topic in agent teamwork supporting information exchange. Further
research is required to extend the current social inference tree approach to thoroughly
explore this interesting field.
An agent may get overloaded by adopting too many commitments. It is worthwhile to
investigate the effects on team performance of different ways by which an agent resolves
the conflicts between helpful commitments (e.g., proactive communicative actions) and its
own responsibilities. Proactive information delivery behaviors among teammates improve
team intelligence but may inevitably introduce redundant information exchanges because
multiple agents in a team might deliver the same piece of information to the information
needer. How to reduce redundant information deliveries among teammates with proactive
information delivery capabilities also remains to be elucidated.
In addition, the formal semantics of InfoNeed and the in-depth analysis of the computa-
tional complexity of reasoning within the framework are also left for future studies.
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